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COUNTERSUITS: A PREFACE
COUNTERSUITS AGAINST
ATTORNEYS-A PREFACE
DAVID G. OWEN*
A growing phenomenon and annoyance for lawyers is the in-
creasing incidence of countersuits brought against them for ille-
gaily filing frivolous claims. The special project that follows
these prefatory remarks examines a variety of different policy
issues raised by this type of litigation in the context of the three
most common theories of liability underlying countersuits
against attorneys-malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and
defamation-and problems faced by lawyers seeking to obtain
liability insurance against such countersuits. No attorney is to-
day immune from having such an action fied against him or her,
and the risks to every lawyer of becoming the defendant in such
an action are increasing every day. Although the courts have
thus far allowed these countersuits against attorneys only reluc-
tantly and in the most extreme cases, every lawyer should be
aware of the fundamental issues and recent changes in this tu-
multuous area of the law.
An initial step for analysis of the attorney countersuit prob-
lem is to inquire into the reasons for the recent increase in such
actions, and a preliminary excursion into these causes is all that
will be attempted here. The first place to look for an explanation
is toward the plaintiff in this type of action and toward the type
of harm that has allegedly been inflicted. Typically, the plaintiff
is a physician who has been sued unsuccessfully by the defen-
dant attorney in an earlier malpractice action brought on behalf
of a party who suffered harm as a patient under the physician's
treatment. The basic claim in the doctor's later countersuit
against the lawyer ordinarily alleges that the earlier malpractice
suit was groundless, frivolous, and should never have been
brought-as a reasonable investigation by the attorney before
filing the lawsuit would have revealed. The harm to the defen-
dant in a groundless lawsuit can indeed be very great, involving
considerable time, expense, anguish, embarrassment, damage to
reputation and professional standing, loss of business, increase
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.S. 1967, Wharton School of Fi-
nance, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1971, University of Pennsylvania.
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in insurance premiums, and sometimes loss of employment.
Even if the defendant in the groundless suit prevails (and there
is always some risk of losing even a "groundless" action), his vic-
tory in the first action alone often cannot fully remedy many of
his losses. It is no wonder, then, that the defendant in a frivo-
lous suit looks to the courts to give him satisfaction.
Another explanation for the proliferation of these claims lies
with the defendants to the countersuits examined here-the
lawyers themselves. It can be postulated with confidence that
some lawyers do sometimes file groundless suits, that sometimes
these suits result from the careless (and on occasion reckless)
action or inaction of the lawyer who fails adequately to examine
the facts or the law of the case, and that sometimes lawyers file
actions that they know full well are devoid of merit. It is easy for
a lawyer to become so accustomed to living daily with the law
that he forgets the awesome power under his control that he can
at will turn loose upon another person-whose life may be seri-
ously and irreparably altered as a result when the law appears
on his doorstep in the form of a sheriff bearing a summons and
complaint. Nor should it be surprising when the plaintiff's at-
torney in an apparently groundless lawsuit becomes the target in
a subsequent action based on.his role in the prior suit. Espe-
cially when the first action looks clearly frivolous to the defen-
dant, the plaintiff's lawyer in that action may well appear to the
defendant as little more than a hired gun, and an unscrupulous
one at that. The lawyer, moreover, may have intimidated and
embarrassed the defendant at deposition or at trial-perhaps in-
tentionally-in a manner naturally engendering enormous hos-
tility in the person facing the brunt of such attacks. Lawyers
themselves, therefore, are to some extent responsible for the in-
crease in countersuits of this type.
A third source of the increasing incidence of these actions
lies in the courts. For at least the past generation, judicial activ-
ism has been marching forward throughout the nation. Although
recent signs indicate that in some respects and places this gen-
eral movement may be slowing down, and in some instances
even turning back toward a policy of restraint, the "forward"
march of the courts creating rights and duties from former dust
is beginning to appear from place to place in the context of
countersuits against attorneys.
A final reason for the increase in these actions may lie in the
314 [Vol. 33
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss2/7
COUNTERSUITS: A PREFACE
law schools. Institutions of legal education have been pumping
out more and more new lawyers in recent years, especially over
the last decade, and the ramifications for actions of the kind ex-
amined here should be apparent. In their search for business,
some new attorneys may not fully understand their new-found
power and responsibilities and hence may be more likely than
their senior brethren to file groundless suits. Moreover, there are
presumably only a determinate number of suits with "merit,"
yet the influx of new lawyers must find business of some type.
So, as the supply of "meritorious" legal business spreads thin,
some lawyers may look harder for merit in a dispute brought by
a potential client who might have been turned away as having a
"groundless" suit if there were more "meritorious" business to
go around. The law schools may thus be responsible not only for
churning out too many lawyers but also for failing to instill in
them an adequate sense of their powers and responsibilities as
officers of the law and of the courts. Perhaps the emphasis in
law schools on creative thinking in deciding why and how to sue
should be tempered by some basic thought regarding the ethics
of deciding whether and when an attorney may fairly sue.
Whether countersuits against attorneys will soon become a
serious threat is difficult to predict. Yet, because such actions
are definitely becoming more common, their essential causes,
elements, implications and insurability need to be studied by
lawyers, judges and legal academics. The following project exam-
ining this topic is thus most timely and should serve as a helpful
springboard into this important area of the law.
1981] 315
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
A malicious prosecution is a civil or criminal action1 brought
maliciously and without probable cause to believe that it will
succeed, by or at the instance of the plaintiff, which terminates
in favor of the defendant, who is damaged thereby.2 To hold his
prosecutor liable, a maliciously prosecuted defendant cannot
cross-claim or counterclaim in the original action8 but instead
must bring a subsequent tort action for malicious prosecution."
Victims of malicious prosecution frequently sue the plain-
tiffs who instigated the original actions,5 but victims are increas-
ingly seeking damages from attorneys who represent plaintiffs in
maliciously prosecuted actions. 6 Although pleading and proof re-
quirements for malicious prosecution are essentially the same in
actions against attorneys as in actions against any other defen-
dant, a plaintiff proceeding against an attorney must overcome
the reluctance of the courts to hold attorneys liable for what
may have been the good faith exercise of professional duty and
judgment.7
1. In some jurisdictions, the term "malicious prosecution" applies only to the wrong-
ful initiation of criminal proceedings, while the term "malicious use of civil process" is
used to denote the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings. See, e.g., Crawford v. Theo,
112 Ga. App. 83, 84, 143 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1965); Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 588-89, 4
S.E.2d 458, 461-62 (1939).
2. Truett v. Georgeson, 273 S.C. 661, 662, 258 S.E.2d 499, 499 (1979).
3. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179,
181 (1971).
4. Id. at 846, 479 P.2d at 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
5. See, e.g., Truett v. Georgeson, 273 S.C. 661, 258 S.E.2d 499 (1979); Ruff v. Eck-
erds Drugs Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 220 S.E.2d 649 (1975); Patterson v. Bogan, 261 S.C. 87, 198
S.E.2d 586 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (N.D. Iowa 1978), afl'd mem.,
590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability of Plaintiff's Counsel
for an Unwarranted Medical Malpractice Suit-New Developments in Physician
Countersuits for Unfounded Medical Malpractice Claims, 7 N. Ky. L. REv. 265 (1980).
The majority of the recent malicious prosecution actions against attorneys have been
brought by physicians as a counterattack to the growing number of medical malpractice
claims. From 89 to 111 physician countersuits have been filed in the last twenty years;
most were filed in the last five years. Id. at 266.
7. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa 1978), aff'd mem.,
7
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This hesitancy stems in part from the nature of malicious
prosecution as a tort that allows a party in an adversary rela-
tionship with an attorney to recover damages for some breach of
duty owed to him by the attorney. Courts are interested in mini-
mizing this duty of attorneys to third parties in order to avoid
the conflict of interest that could result from recognizing an at-
torney's duty of care to both his client and his client's adver-
sary.8 This concern of the courts must be balanced against the
rights of wrongfully sued defendants to be compensated. 9 This
section of the project will outline the basic elements of a cause
of action in malicious prosecution and will consider the willing-
ness of the courts to impose liability on attorneys who bring friv-
olous actions.
II. BACKGROUND
The tort of malicious prosecution was originally designed to
achieve a balance between the competing policies of keeping vin-
dictive and harassing suits out of court and of giving the public
free access to the courts without fear of reprisal by retaliatory
litigation.10 The tort arose in England and evolved there as part
of a comprehensive system, the central feature of which is an
internal sanction against frivolous litigation."
The early Anglo-Saxon legal system harshly punished the
instigation of false suits, but the system was replaced after the
Norman invasion of England by a system of amercement, which
allowed the King or court to assess a monetary penalty against
one found guilty of bringing a false suit. 2 Although amercement
was more flexible than its predecessor, it did not provide an ade-
quate remedy for victims of frivolous suits, because penalties
590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978).
8. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240
(1975); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
9. 49 Cal. App. 3d at 922, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
10. Mallen, An Attorney's Liability for Malicious Prosecution, A Misunderstood
Tort, 46 INs. COUNSEL J. 407, 409 (1979).
11. Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Histori-
cal Analysis, 88 YAL.E L.J. 1218, 1229 (1979).
12. Id. at 1221. Anglo-Saxon courts required a losing complainant to pay his oppo-
nent a sum based on the opponent's social status or, in lieu of payment, to lose his
tongue. Id.
[Vol. 33
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
were paid directly to the King or court."3 In response to the
plight of the victims of false suits, the writ of conspiracy was
created as the first external sanction for misuse of the English
legal system. This writ recognized an action for the wrongful ini-
tiation of legal process but was available only against straw-
parties.
1 4
With the appearance of action on the case, the English
courts were able to fashion a broader remedy for the many types
of malicious prosecutions that were unreachable by the writ of
conspiracy.1 5 In 1269, the Statute of Marlbridgel e created a stat-
utory right in successful defendants in maliciously prosecuted
civil actions to recover costs and damages in the same action.
This right eventually led to the requirement in the English sys-
tem that a person seeking to bring a subsequent tort action for
malicious prosecution must show special damage beyond that or-
dinarily incurred in defending a lawsuit and for which he had
already been compensated.' Because the tort of malicious pros-
ecution is a remedy that is secondary to the imposition of costs
in the original action, it is disfavored by the English courts.
The American legal community has adopted the tort of ma-
licious prosecution, but without the internal sanctions of the En-
glish system. Since its adoption, the tort has developed in two
forms. A significant minority of American jurisdictions follow
the English rule in civil cases," requiring a plaintiff to plead and
prove malice, lack of probable cause, favorable termination, and
special injury beyond that normally incurred in defending a law-
suit.2' "Special injury" ordinarily means deprivation of liberty or
13. Id. at 1222-23.
14. Id. at 1224-25.
15. Id. at 1227.
16. Statute of Marlbridge, 1269, 52 Hen. 3.
17. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 11, at 1228-29. In dictum in the early
English case of Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698), the court
created the special damage category that evolved into the modern English rule. Id.
18. Eighteen jurisdictions follow the minority English rule. See note 19 infra.
19. Davis v. Boyle Bros., 73 A.2d 517 (D.C. 1950); Price v. Fidelity Trust, 74 Ga.
App. 836, 41 S.E.2d 614 (1947); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 IMI. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937);
Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 18 N.W. 870 (1884); Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240
S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1951); North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441
(1945); Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382 (1816); Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310,
142 P.2d 546 (1943); Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495 (1905), appeal dismissed,
203 U.S. 129 (1906); Pittsburg J.E. & E.R. Co. v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 138 N.C. 174,
50 S.E. 571 (1905); Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489, 56 N.E. 198
1981] 319
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property,20 and courts in a minority of jurisdictions strictly con-
strue the special injury requirement.21 Humiliation, embarrass-
ment, emotional anguish, subjection to public scorn and ridi-
cule,22 injury to reputation, and increased liability insurance
premiums2s have been held insufficient to constitute special in-
jury. Some jurisdictions, however, have recognized as special
damages the loss of the right to practice a profession2 4 and busi-
ness losses resulting from a suit.
25
The majority of American jurisdictions,26 including South
Carolina,27 have eliminated the special injury requirement, rec-
ognizing that because the tort of malicious prosecution is not a
secondary remedy in the United States and is unaccompanied by
an internal sanction system, the English rule should not be ap-
(1900); Mitchell v. Silver Lake Lodge, 29 Or. 294, 45 P. 798 (1896); Norcross v. Otis Bros.
& Co., 152 Pa. 481, 25 A. 575 (1893); Ring v. Ring, 102 R.I. 112, 228 A.2d 582 (1967);
Smith v. Adams, 27 Tex. 28 (1863); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108
(1980); Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash. 2d 211, 266 P.2d 1047 (1954); Myhre v. Hessey,
242 Wis. 638, 9 N.W.2d 106 (1943).
20. Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1083-84, 266 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1980).
21. See Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability of Plaintiff's Counsel, supra note 6,
at 274.
22. Greer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 139 Ga. App. 74, 78, 227 S.E.2d 881, 885
(1976).
23. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 IMI. App. 3d 940, 946, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (1978).
24. Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 353, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1964).
25. Rivers v. Dixie Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131, 138, 76 S.E.2d 229, 236
(1953).
26. Twenty-three states follow the majority rule. See Peerson v. Ashcroft Cotton
Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966
(1932); Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 290 S.W.2d 632 (1956); Eastin v. Bank of Stock-
ton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884); Sell v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932);
Calvo v. Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 152 A. 311 (1930); Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Inv.
Co. v. Watson, 92 Fla. 278, 109 So. 623 (1926); McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538 (1882);
Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 P. 781 (1903); Graffagnini v. Schnaider,
164 La. 1108, 115 So. 287 (1927); White v. Dingley, 4 Mass. 433 (1808); Brand v. Hinch-
man, 68 Mich. 590, 36 N.W. 664 (1888); O'Neill v. Johnson, 53 Minn. 439, 55 N.W. 601
(1893); Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So. 2d 863 (1961); Brady v. Ervin, 48 Mo. 533
(1871); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 88 N.W. 497 (1901);
Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Johnson v. Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 72 P.2d
715 (1937); Cisson v. Pickens Say. and Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972);
Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 174 N.W. 620 (1919); Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96
Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896); Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209 (1869); Van Hunter v.
Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 40 S.E.2d 332 (1946).
27. Cisson v. Pickens Say. and Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972). The
court in Cisson stated that "while there is authority to the contrary, we find no sound
basis to deny a cause of action for malicious prosecution founded upon any ordinary civil
proceeding, where the necessary elements are present." Id. at 43, 186 S.E.2d at 825.
10
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
plied. These jurisdictions follow the American or Restatement
rule, 8 which requires a plaintiff, when the prior action is civil, to
plead and prove only malice, lack of probable cause, and
favorable termination of the prior action. 29 When the underlying
action is criminal, both majority and minority jurisdictions re-
quire pleading and proof only of malice, lack of probable cause,
and favorable termination.30
III. ELEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Favorable Termination of a Prior Proceeding
At the threshold, a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution ac-
tion must be able to show that a prior proceeding has termi-
nated 1 and that the termination was in his favor.3 2 Two consid-
erations underlie this rule. First, the possibility exists that juries
in two separate -actions might render inconsistent verdicts con-
cerning lack of probable cause for the original action.3 3 Second,
and more important in the context of malicious prosecution ac-
tions against attorneys, concurrent actions might result in depri-
vation of effective counsel for the plaintiff in the original action:
if a malicious prosecution action could be filed before termina-
tion of the original action, an attorney's interest in protecting
himself against a possible malicious prosecution claim might
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977).
29. See cases cited at note 26 supra. In jurisdictions following the majority rule, a
successful plaintiff may recover attorney's fees, costs, and other such damages as he may
prove. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977). In jurisdictions following the En-
glish rule, once a plaintiff alleges and proves special injury beyond that normally in-
curred in defending litigation, actual damages may also be recovered. Bickel v. Mackie,
477 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978). Punitive damages may normally be awarded in both
jurisdictions when a cause of action exists for actual damages. Theo v. Crawford, 119 Ga.
App. 81, 166 S.E.2d 368 (1969). For further discussion of the availability of punitive
damages, see note 70 infra.
30. See, e.g., Powell v. Cohen, 116 Ga. App. 48, 50, 156 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1967); Ruff
v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 566, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975).
31. Harreilson v. Johnson, 119 S.C. 59, 61, 111 S.E. 882, 882 (1921); Whaley v. Law-
ton, 57 S.C. 256, 259, 35 S.E. 558, 559-60 (1900)(dictum).
32. Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965).
33. See Mallen, supra note 10, at 412; Note, What Constitutes a Termination in
Favor of the Plaintiff in Order to Successfully Maintain an Action for Malicious Prose-
cution in South Carolina?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 375, 376 (1954).
Lack of probable cause is a question of fact in an action for malicious prosecution
and is usually determined by the jury. Parrot v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. at 323, 143
S.E.2d at 609.
1981]
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conflict with his interest in pursuing his client's original action. 4
Although criminal proceedings and civil suits commonly
supply the basis for malicious prosecution claims, other proceed-
ings having "the earmarks of a separate proceeding" will support
an action for malicious prosecution.35 Thus, a cross-complaint
for affirmative relief3 6 or interposition of a defense by an inter-
vening party3 7 may support a subsequent action for malicious
prosecution, but a request for admissions and other discovery
proceedings will not.3s Other types of proceedings that courts
have held sufficient to sustain malicious prosecution actions in-
clude issuance of a search" or arrest"0 warrant; some types of
federal 41 or state42 administrative proceedings; and interference
with property by the appointment of a receiver, the granting of
an injunction, or the issuance of a writ of replevin. a
Because a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must
show termination of a prior proceeding in his favor, he cannot
seek relief through a cross-claim or counterclaim in the original
action.4" The plaintiff may establish favorable termination by
showing, among other things, the dismissal of a criminal
charge," a discharge by a magistrate upon preliminary investiga-
34. See Mallen, supra note 10, at 412.
35. Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 922, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (1976).
36. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 53, 529 P.2d 608, 616, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 192 (1975).
37. Cisson v. Pickens Say. and Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. at 43-44, 186 S.E.2d at 825.
38. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 922, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
39. Spangler v. Booze, 103 Va. 276, 278, 49 S.E. 42, 43 (1904).
40. See, e.g., Patterson v. Bogan, 261 S.C. 87, 198 S.E.2d 586 (1973). An arrest based
upon a void warrant will not sustain a malicious prosecution action in some states. See,
e.g., Lowe v. Turner, 115 Ga. App. 503, 506, 154 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1967).
41. Rivers v. Dixie Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131, 76 S.E.2d 229 (1953).
42. Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 137 S.E.2d 139 (1964). An administrative pro-
ceeding that is adjudicatory in nature and that may adversely affect legally protected
interests will support a malicious prosecution action. Id. at 352, 137 S.E.2d at 145.
43. Manufacturers & Jobbers Fin. Corp. v. Lane, 221 N.C. 189, 196, 19 S.E.2d 849,
853 (1942)(dictum)(defendant's counterclaim failed to state a cause of action for mali-
cious prosecution). For examples of other proceedings that will sustain a malicious prose-
cution action, see Mallen, supra note 10, at 410-11.
44. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179,
181 (1971)(dicta); Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pearce, 121 Ga. App. 835, 840, 175
S.E.2d 910, 915 (1970).
45. Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 506, 172 S.E. 870, 873 (1934).
Dismissal of a charge by reason of failure of the complainant to appear and prosecute
has been held to constitute favorable termination. Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 170, 147
S.E.2d 910, 913 (1966).
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tion," an order discharging the accused,47 or in some jurisdic-
tions, an entry of nolle prosequi.'4 On the other hand, termina-
tions of proceedings by agreement between the parties or at the
instance or consent of the maliciously prosecuted party" and
settlements or compromises in the absence of fraud or duress do
not constitute favorable terminations." Furthermore, dismissal
or discharge by a magistrate with no jurisdiction to try the
case, 51 placement of a criminal prosecution on a dead docket,
5 2
and return of a "no bill" by a grand jury without discharge by
the court" cannot be deemed favorable terminations.
B. Lack of Probable Cause
In addition to showing favorable termination of a prior pro-
ceeding, a plaintiff must prove that no probable cause existed
for the belief that the action would succeed." Probable cause in
the context of malicious prosecution actions is defined as that
46. Glover v. Heyward, 108 S.C. 486, 489, 94 S.E. 878, 878 (1918).
47. Clemmons v. Nicholson, 188 S.C. 124, 130, 198 S.E. 180, 183 (1938)(prima facie
evidence of termination).
48. Perry v. Hurdle, 229 N. C. 216, 219, 49 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1948). A nolle prosequi
is a formal entry by the prosecuting officer in which he declares that he will not prose-
cute the case further. State v. Gaskins, 263 S.C. 343, 347, 210 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1974).
Whether an entry of nolle prosequi will sustain a malicious prosecution action in
South Carolina is uncertain. Early cases held that it would not. See, e.g., Heyward v.
Cuthbert, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 354 (1827). The United States District Court in South
Carolina, however, has found an entry of nolle prosequi sufficient to support a subse-
quent malicious prosecution claim. White v. Coleman, 277 F. Supp. 292, 297 n.2 (D.S.C.
1967). In its decision, the district court relied on an early South Carolina Supreme Court
case, Harrelson v. Johnson, 119 S.C. 59, 111 S.E. 882 (1921). Harrelson, however, cited
Heyward with approval. Thus, the district court's reason for reliance on Harrelson is not
clear. It is certain, however, that the filing of a nolle prosequi accompanied by a dis-
charge by the court, which will support favorable termination, may be used as prima
facie evidence of lack of probable cause in South Carolina. Lipford v. M'Collum, 19
S.C.L. (1 Hill) 82 (1833).
49. E.g., Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 506, 172 S.E. 870, 873
(1934)(dictum)(facts of case did not establish termination by consent or agreement).
50. See Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965
(1950).
51. See Whaley v. Lawton, 57 S.C. 256, 35 S.E. 558 (1900).
52. Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581, 583, 188 S.E.2d 396, 397-98 (1972).
53. Thomas v. DeGraffenreid, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC) 143, 145 (1819).
54. See Kinton v. Mobile Home Indus., Inc., 274 S.C. 179, 181, 262 S.E.2d 727, 728
(1980); Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1965)(de-
fendant in malicious prosecution action need not prove that he had probable cause to
bring the original action; the burden of proof is on the plaintiff); Hogg v. Pinckney, 16
S.C. 387, 393 (1881).
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which would warrant the belief by a reasonable man, taking into
account the surrounding facts and circumstances, that the prose-
cution is legally just and proper.55 One court has articulated a
two-part test for determining whether an attorney has probable
cause to bring an action.56 First, probable cause exists when, af-
ter a reasonable investigation and an industrious search of legal
authority, an attorney has an honest belief that his client's claim
is tenable in the forum in which it is brought. Second, the attor-
ney's subjective belief in his client's claim must satisfy an objec-
tive standard-the belief must be that of a reasonable attor-
ney.57 Only those facts and circumstances that were or should
have been known to the defendant in a malicious prosecution
action at the time he brought the original action may be taken
into account in determining whether he had probable cause."8
For purposes of determining the existence of probable
cause, an attorney is not required to view the representations of
his client with such distrust that he conducts a thorough investi-
gation of the facts to ensure that his client is telling the truth;59
a good faith inquiry into the facts before him is all that is re-
quired.60 Even a showing that the attorney has discovered evi-
dence contrary to the position taken by his client does not in
itself support an inference of a lack of honest belief in the tena-
bility of his client's claim. 61 Moreover, an attorney need not be
convinced that his client's claim is strong or that it will be
successful.
62
Surrounding facts and circumstances such as a conviction in
the prior proceeding' 3 or a return of a bill of indictment by a
grand jury6 4 may be sufficient to show probable cause. The in-
55. Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 568, 220 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1975); Hyde
v. Southern Grocery Stores, 197 S.C. 263, 277, 15 S.E.2d 353, 359 (1941).
56. See Tool Research and Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 291 (1975).
57. Id. at 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
58. Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 572, 99 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1957).
59. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 684, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98.
60. Id. at 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
61. Id. at 684, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
62. Id. at 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297. Requirement of such a belief would encourage
attorneys to take only popular cases or those cases that do not contradict existing policy.
Mallen, supra note 10, at 414.
63. Falkner v. Almon, 22 N.C. App. 643, 645, 207 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1974)(conclusive
evidence of probable cause).
64. Kinton v. Mobile Home Indus., Inc., 274 S.C. 179, 182, 262 S.E.2d 727, 728
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verse is not true, however, and an acquittal 5 or a return of a "no
bill" by a grand jury66 is not prima facie evidence of a lack of
probable cause. In the absence of fraud, a finding of probable
cause by a magistrate or lower court in the original action is
prima facie evidence of probable cause to bring the action, not-
withstanding a reversal or acquittal by a higher court.67
C. Malice
Malice, "a critical element in an action for malicious prose-
cution,"6 8 must also be proved by an injured plaintiff.69 Gener-
ally, malice is evidenced by "a wrongful act intentionally done
without just cause or excuse.17 0 In malicious prosecution actions
against attorneys, malice has been found upon a showing that an
attorney acted in bad faith and with an improper purpose in
bringing suit. 1 A showing that an attorney had knowledge of his
client's malice and lack of probable cause and that he partici-
pated in the prosecution with that knowledge is sufficient to es-
tablish that the attorney himself was motivated by malice. 2
(1980)(prima facie evidence of probable cause).
65. Fowle v. Fowle, 263 N.C. 724, 729, 140 S.E.2d 398, 402 (1965).
66. Fulmer v. Harmon, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 576, 581 (1849).
67. See, e.g., Baranan v. Kazakos, 125 Ga. App. 19, 22, 186 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1971);
Priddy v. Cook's United Dep't Store, 17 N.C. App. 322, 324, 194 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1973).
68. Truett v. Georgeson, 273 S.C. 661, 662, 258 S.E.2d 499, 499 (1979)(citation
omitted).
69. Margolis v. Telech, 239 S.C. 232, 237, 122 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1961).
70. Id. at 238, 122 S.E.2d at 419-20 (citing Hogg v. Pinckney, 16 S.C. 387, 398
(1881)). There are two types of malice: actual and legal. The definition provided in the
text is that generally given for legal malice. Actual malice or malice in fact can be shown
by establishing that the prosecutor was motivated by ill will, spite, grudge, or conscious
disregard of the rights of another. Lee v. Southland Corp., 219 Va. 23, 244 S.E.2d 756
(1978). Because both types of malice will support an action for malicious prosecution, the
distinction, for the most part, is unimportant in this context. In some jurisdictions, how-
ever, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages only when he has shown that the defen-
dant acted with actual malice; legal malice will not sustain an award of punitive dam-
ages. E.g., id. at 27, 244 S.E.2d at 759; Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 353, 137 S.E.2d
139, 145 (1964).
71. Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 595, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1967).
72. Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 150-51, 3 S.W. 577, 581 (1887). An attorney's
partners in a law firm ordinarily will not be held vicariously liable, absent a showing that
they were active, knowledgeable participants in the frivolous suit. See Jackson v. Jack-
son, 20 N.C. App. 406, 201 S.E.2d 722 (1974)(the court relied in part on NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR CODE OF PRoFEssIo AL REsPONsmILrTY, DR 7-102(A)(1),-(7), to hold that an
attorney engaging in a malicious prosecution is not acting within the ordinary course of
partnership business, and thus his partners cannot be held vicariously liable).
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When an attorney acts in good faith reliance on his client's
representations, courts have declined to infer or find malice,
even though his advice to sue was mistaken. 3 "Good faith" im-
plies that the attorney has a reasonable basis for believing his
client's representations.7 4 Unless the presence of malice is obvi-
ous from the facts or the attorney has special knowledge that his
client is maliciously motivated and has no probable cause, an
attorney may act on the assumption that his client is honest.7 5
In some jurisdictions, malice sufficient to sustain a malicious
prosecution action is evidenced by "wanton or reckless refusal to
make reasonable investigation with regard to the propriety of a
prosecution, or by the refusal to terminate such prosecution
upon notice that it is wrongful. 76 At least one court, however,
has refused to find malice when an attorney failed to interview
or consult with any witnesses before filing a medical malpractice
suit, noting that an opposite ruling might have serious conse-
quences when a failure to investigate before filing suit was rea-
sonably motivated by considerations such as imminent expira-
tion of the statute of limitations.7 Another court has construed
an attorney's violation of the ABA Code of Professional Respon-
sibility to be evidence of malice in an action for malicious prose-
cution.78 In DeDaviess v. U-Haul Co.,79 the Georgia Court of Ap-
peals held an attorney liable for malicious prosecution and
predicated its finding of malice on the attorney's pursuit of a
criminal course of action to collect a debt in violation of a canon
73. See, e.g., Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803
(1967).
74. See North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 208, 44 A.2d 441, 445
(1945). See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
75. Maechtlen v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 781, 250 P. 303, 304 (1926).
76. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973)(citations
omitted).
77. See Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 599 (La. App. 1976).
78. Many plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions against attorneys have argued
violation of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility as an alternative cause of ac-
tion to malicious prosecution, but the courts have been reluctant to interpret the attor-
ney's code of ethics as creating a private cause of action. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447
F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980). Plaintiffs frequently argue
that the ABA CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSMIIUTY, DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980), which pro-
hibits an attorney from bringing a suit to maliciously injure another, creates a duty of
care to the attorney's adversary.
79. 154 Ga. App. 124, 267 S.E.2d 633 (1980).
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of the Georgia code of ethics."0
Malice need not be demonstrated explicitly but may be in-
ferred from want of probable cause,81 although this inference
may be rebutted by a showing of no malice on the part of the
defendant.82 Courts are willing to draw this inference because
"where a person institute[s] a prosecution against another with-
out probable cause, it is difficult to conceive of any other motive
but a malicious one for bringing the prosecution."8 3 Drawing this
inference is not in keeping with the usual strictures placed on
standards of proof in malicious prosecution cases, however, and
courts generally do not draw the opposite inference-that the
presence of malice creates an inference of a lack of probable
cause.
8 4
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TORT IN ACTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS
Malicious prosecution is, with few exceptions, 5 the sole
cause of action available to many victims of frivolous lawsuits.86
Other potential theories of liability such as negligence, prima fa-
cie tort, and violation of an attorney's code of ethics8 7 have been
uniformly rejected because of the courts' reluctance to create an
unduly broad duty of care when a cause of action molded by
centuries of judicial attention to competing policies already ex-
ists under the tort of malicious prosecution.88
80. Id. at 126, 267 S.E.2d at 635.
81. Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 574, 99 S.E.2d 384, 389 (1957).
82. Bell v. Graham, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 278 (1818).
83. Baker v. Hornik, 57 S.C. 213, 227-28, 35 S.E. 524, 529 (1900).
84. Cisson v. Pickens Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 44, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825
(1972)(citing Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E.2d 607, 609
(1965)).
85. Under certain circumstances, a wrongfully prosecuted party may be able to pro-
ceed against an attorney on theories of abuse of process or false imprisonment. See
Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581, 188 S.E.2d 396 (1972)(dictum); Huggins v.
Winn Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693, appeal after remand, 252 S.C.
353, 166 S.E.2d 297 (1967)(dictum).
Although not directly beneficial to him, a wrongfully prosecuted party may also
make a complaint to the bar committee to have a disciplinary action brought against an
attorney. Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 662, 260 S.E.2d 130, 135 (1979)(dictum).
86. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
87. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978)(negligence, abuse
of process, and violation of the code of ethics); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386
N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978)(prima facie tort).
88. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 920-22, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239-
41 (1975); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 661, 260 S.E.2d 130, 135 (1979).
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Because damages for malicious prosecution may be a plain-
tiff's exclusive remedy and because a standard of care that is too
restrictive may vitiate the right of maliciously prosecuted parties
to be compensated, the standard of care applied in malicious
prosecution actions should approximate the public's expecta-
tions of reasonable competence in attorneys. It is reasonable to
expect that attorneys will undertake at least a preliminary inves-
tigation of the facts and law before bringing a suit.8 9 Moreover,
if an attorney has reason to believe that no basis exists for a
claim or that his client is motivated by malice, then he should
advise the client of the potential liability that attaches to ven-
geance suits and should consider the possibility of withdrawing
from the case or declining the employment.90
In practice, however, attorneys are rarely held liable to ad-
versaries unless the conduct in question is particularly egregious.
Peerman v. Sidicane,91 a recent Tennessee case, illustrates the
level of conduct that will support an action for malicious prose-
cution. In that case an attorney was held liable for the malicious
prosecution of a medical malpractice suit after he alleged, with
absolutely no factual basis, that the defendant physician had en-
gaged in fee splitting.9 2 In Munson v. Linnick,9 3 a California at-
torney was held liable for bringing suit solely to harrass a party
into paying for goods in order that he might recover his fifty
percent contingency fee.94 By limiting recovery under the tort of
malicious prosecution to cases concerning flagrant conduct, the
courts overlook the plight of legitimately injured victims of less
offensive conduct.
A more equitable balance of the various parties' interests
might be achieved by adopting the approach of assessing costs
within the maliciously prosecuted action-the internal sanction
89. See Tool Research and Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1975).
90. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSioNAL RESPONSm.ITY, DR 2-110(B)(1) (1980), which
provides that an attorney must withdraw from an action if he knows the suit was mali-
ciously brought.
91. 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1980).
92. Id. at 243.
93. 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967).
94. Id. at 591-92, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 341-42. One observer notes that the more egre-
gious instances of misconduct may never go to trial but are settled, which may account
for the small number of cases holding attorneys liable to their opposing parties. Note,
Malicious Prosecution Liability of Plaintiff's Counsel, supra note 6, at 280.
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that is the pillar of the English system.95 Yet, because the impo-
sition of costs is generally considered a matter within the pur-
view of the legislature, few courts have been willing to assess
costs in frivolously prosecuted suits.98 Thus, absent legislative
action, attorneys are likely to be safe from liability for malicious
prosecution unless their conduct can be characterized as inten-
tional and egregious.
Faye A. Flowers
95. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 11, at 1232-33.
96. See Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Ju-
dicial Process, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 619, 621-22(1977).
1981]
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a significant expansion of tort
liability1 and a dramatic increase in the amount of damages
awarded to successful litigants.2 These circumstances, coupled
with the prosperity that they have occasioned for attorneys,
have led to an increase in the number of frivolous lawsuits.3 The
targets of groundless suits, often physicians who have been sued
for medical malpractice, occasionally seek legal redress for
financial and personal costs resulting from suits in which they
were ultimately found to be without liability. Although the suc-
cess of these efforts to recover such losses has generally been
limited,5 the attorney who has represented a plaintiff in a
groundless suit nevertheless may become the defendant in a law
suit brought by his client's opponents for abuse of process. This
section of the project will consider the elements of a cause of
action for abuse of process and the efficacy of this remedy as a
deterrent to attorneys who might bring frivolous lawsuits on be-
half of their clients.8
1. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, Preface, at xi (4th ed. 1971); Note,
Attorneys' Liability to Clients' Adversaries for Instituting Frivolous Lawsuits: A Reas-
sertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHNS L. Rxv. 775 (1979).
2. Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 1, at 775; Project, The Medical Malprac-
tice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuKE L. J. 939, 940-42 & n.4.
3. Biernbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Un-
justified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDAM L. Rpv. 1003, 1008-14 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Bull v. McCuskey, -
Nev. _ 615 P.2d 957 (1980); Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242
(1980); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130 (1979).
5. Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 1, at 775.
6. See Antelman v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1979); Voytko v. Ramada Inn,
445 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1978); Bird v. Rothman, - Ariz. App. -, 627 P.2d 1097
(1981); Laird v. Vogel, 334 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Little v. Sowers, 167
Kan. 72, 204 P.2d 605 (1949); Jacobs v. Mann, 300 Mass. 258, 15 N.E.2d 482 (1938);
Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Journeymen, Inc. v.
Judson, 40 Or. App. 249, 608 P.2d 563 (1980).
7. The attorney may also be sued for libel and slander, 33 S.C.L. REv. 341 (1981);
malicious prosecution, 33 S.C.L. REv. 315 (1981); negligence, Morowitz v. Marvel, 423
A.2d 196; or "prima facie tort", Fox v. Issler, 77 A.D.2d 860, 431 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1980).
8. Thus, the scope of this section will not extend beyond the liability of a private
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II. BACKGROUND
Abuse of process, first recognized as a separate and distinct
cause of action in 1838 in the landmark case of Grainger v. Hill,9
evolved out of the necessity to provide a remedy for injured par-
ties who had no cause of action for malicious prosecution. In
Grainger, the mortgagee of a ship, aware that the ship's master
would be unable to repay a loan secured by the ship's registry,
had the master arrested before the loan was due and threatened
him with imprisonment to compel him to surrender the ship's
registry.10 Although the court held that there could be no recov-
ery for malicious prosecution," the plaintiff nevertheless pre-
vailed on the novel theory of abuse of process. This theory dis-
pensed with the requirements of want of probable cause and
successful termination of the prior proceeding, both of which
must be proved in an action for malicious prosecution. 12
American courts soon accepted the rationale of Grainger,"3
and, today, every American jurisdiction recognizes the tort of
abuse of process.' 4 Although the first abuse of process suit
against an attorney, Dishaw v. Wadleigh,'5 was unsuccessful, the
court in that case recognized that such a cause of action could lie
attorney for abuse of process, although others involved in the judicial system face such
potential liability. See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579 (Miss.
1968)(justice of the peace); Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 101 A.2d 535 (1953)(prosecutor);
Dean v. Kochendorfer, 206 A.D. 777, 220 N.Y.S. 919 (1923), rev'd, 237 N.Y. 384, 143 N.E.
229 (1924) (magistrate).
9. 4 Bing (N.C.) 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838).
10. Id. at 215-16, 132 Eng. Rep. at 770-71.
11. Here, a lack of favorable termination of the prior action precluded an action for
malicious prosecution. Id. at 215-16, 132 Eng. Rep. at 770-71. See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 121; Note, Abuse of Process: A Gap in Alabama Law, 10 CUM. L. REV.
209, 210 (1979); Note, Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood Concept, 20 CLv. ST. L.
REV. 401, 402-03 (1971).
12. 4 Bing (N.C.) at 215-16, 132 Eng. Rep. at 770-71.
13. See, e.g., Page v. Cushing, 38 Me. 523 (1854); Smith v. Weeks, 60 Wisc. 94, 18
N.W. 778, 784 (1884)(implicitly).
14. See, e.g., Antelman v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1979); Wilson v.
Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1979); Bird v. Rothman, - Ariz. App. -, 627 P.2d 1097
(1981); Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich.
App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. _ 615 P.2d 957 (1980);
Journeymen, Inc. v. Judson, 40 Or. App. 249, 608 P.2d 563 (1980); Huggins v. Winn Dixie
Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967); Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn.
App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980). See also, Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 688 (1980).
15. 15 A.D. 205, 44 N.Y.S. 207 (1897).
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against an attorney as well as against his client."l
III. A CAUSE OF ACTION
An action for abuse of process" arises whenever regularly
issued legal process is used to accomplish a goal or purpose for
which the process was not designed.' Generally, a plaintiff must
prove only three essential elements to be successful: (1) an ulte-
rior motive or malice; (2) an act in the use of process that
amounts to a misuse or perversion of legal procedure; and (3) an
injury resulting from the misuse of process against him.19
A. Ulterior Motive
The plaintiff in an action for abuse of process must first es-
tablish that the party who allegedly abused the legal process did
so with an ulterior motive or malice.20 This element requires a
showing that the defendant had a wrongful purpose in his use of
16. Id. at 211-12, 44 N.Y.S. at 210.
17. The cause of action is sometimes called "malicious abuse of process". 3 J.
DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 41.09 (1977); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMS, LAW OF TORTS § 4.9
(1956); 72 C.J.S. Process § 119 (1951).
18. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 46 (1977). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts states that "[o]ne who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil,
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject
to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
19. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abuse of Process § 4 (1962); 72 C.J.S. Process § 120(b) (1951).
Most courts incorporate the third element as part of the second element. See, e.g., Bird
v. Rothman, - Ariz. App. _, 627 P.2d 1097 (1981); Geier v. Jordan, 107 A.2d 440, 441
(D.C. 1954); Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. -, -, 615 P.2d 957, 960 (1980); Peerman v.
Sidicane, - Tenn. App. -, -, 605 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1980). A small minority of courts
require additional elements. See Walden v. Walden, 355 So. 2d 372 (Ala. Civ. App.
1978)(requiring both regularly issued process and a want of probable cause); Delk v. Co-
lonial Fin. Co., 118 Ohio App. 451, 194 N.E.2d 885 (1963)(drawing no distinction be-
tween actions for abuse of process and those for malicious prosecution). A number of
commentators have criticized the minority positions. See Note, Abuse of Process: A Gap
in Alabama Law, supra note 11, at 210-14; Note, Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood
Concept, supra note 11, at 405-07.
20. Bird v. Rothman, - Ariz. App. -, 627 P.2d 1097 (1981); Younger v. Solomon,
38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 297, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1974); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902,
905 (Iowa 1978); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 68 Mich. App. 360, 366, 242 N.W.2d 775,
778 (1976); Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. -, -, 615 P.2d 957, 960 (1980); Petrou v. Hale,
43 N.C. App. 655, 659, 260 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1979); Haggerty v. Moyerman, 321 Pa. 555,
559, 184 A. 654, 655 (1936); Nagy v. McBurney, - R.I. _, , 392 A.2d 365, 367
(1978); Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. -, . 605 S.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1980).
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process in a prior action,21 that is, that the goal of the prior ac-
tion was not encompassed within the proper use of process.
22
Ulterior motive may be difficult to prove.23 The courts have
recognized, however, that several motives are clearly improper.
It has been held, for example, that an unsuccessful attempt to
force a settlement in one case may be evidence of an ulterior
motive for the instigation of a second, unfounded suit;24 that the
desire by one attorney to gain an advantage over another in
pending litigation may be a malicious motive for instituting dis-
ciplinary proceedings against the other attorney;25 and that an
ulterior motive exists if an action is brought solely to harass an
opponent2" or to extort money not owed.27 Furthermore, some
courts have been willing to infer the existence of an ulterior mo-
tive from misuse or misapplication of legal process.
28
B. Misuse of Legal Procedure
Because "there is no liability [for abuse of process] where
the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process
to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions, ' '2
21. 72 C.J.S. Process § 121 (1951). See also Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198
(D.C. 1980); Little v. Sowers, 167 Kan. 72, 204 P.2d 605, 608 (1949); Bull v. McCuskey,
- Nov. -, -, 615 P.2d 957, 960 (1980). The term "wrongful purpose" is sometimes
referred to as an intent to seek a collateral advantage. Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App.
3d 916, 923, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (1976).
22. 72 C.J.S. Process § 121 (1951); 1 Am. JuR. 2D Abuse of Process § 1 (1962).
23. It is especially difficult to prove that an attorney had an ulterior motive. See
notes 53-79 and accompanying text infra.
24. Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. , , 615 P.2d 957, 960 (1980).
25. Netterville v. Lear Seigler, Inc., No. 52,531 (Miss., filed April 29, 1981). See also
Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 298, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119 (1974)(desire to
use interrogatory for purpose of making disciplinary proceedings known to public consti-
tuted malicious motive).
26. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 46 A.D.2d 794, 795,
360 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925, af'd, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
But see Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 923, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (1976)
(holding that intent to harass is not sufficient ulterior motive).
27. Voytko v. Ramada Inn, 445 F. Supp. 315, 324-25 (D.N.J. 1978); Little v. Sowers,
167 Ken. 72, 204 P.2d 605, 608 (1949); Huggins v. Winn Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C.
206, 212, 153 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1967).
28. For examples of factual situations in which courts have permitted this inference,
see text accompanying notes 33-40 infra.
29. DiSante v. Russ Financial Co., 251 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 189, 380 A.2d 439, 441
(1977). See also Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 68 Mich. App. 360, 362, 242 N.W.2d 775,
778 (1976); Drago v. Buonagurio, 61 A.D.2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 778,
386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
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ulterior motive alone does not constitute an abuse of process.30
The essence of the tort is the improper use of regularly issued
process.31 Thus, even if a plaintiff establishes that the defendant
had an ulterior motive in bringing an earlier suit, he must still
prove that the defendant misused or perverted the legal process.
Misuse or perversion may be found when an act of the defen-
dant was done "under the authority of the court... [and this
act was equivalent to] a perversion of the judicial process to the
accomplishment of an improper purpose."32
Courts have held that a variety of acts constitute a perver-
sion of legal process.3 8 Misuse of process has been found in the
initiation, without any investigation of the facts, of a groundless
medical malpractice action;3 in receipt of judgments against a
30. Absent an allegation of abuse of process, mere allegation of improper motive is
insufficient to state a cause of action. Hannes v. DeLuca, 203 Misc. 562, 562-63, 117
N.Y.S.2d 522, 522 (1952)(no legal "process" involved because compliance concerned a
"request to appear which, unlike response to a subpoena, was voluntary). See also Cart-
wright v. Wexler, Wexler & Heller, Ltd., 53 IMI. App. 3d 983, 986, 369 N.E.2d 185, 188
(1977); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 68 Mich. App. 360, 242 N.W.2d 775, 778
(1976); DiSante v. Russ Financial Co., 251 Pa. Super. 184, 189, 380 A.2d 439, 441 (1977).
31. Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974). "The gist of
the tort is the misuse of the power of the court. . . . "Id. at 297, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
See also, 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 11, § 4.9; 3 J. DooLsw, supra note 17, §
41.11. Some courts have denied recovery for abuse of process where no probable cause to
initiate legal process existed. E.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa),
af'd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Ala. 1979).
These decisions, however, have been criticized for their unsound reasoning. See Note,
Abuse of Process: A Gap in Alabama Law, supra note 11, at 209; Note, Abuse of Pro-
cess-A Misunderstood Concept, supra note 11, at 1401.
32. Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 297, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1974).
The term "process" has been broadly interpreted to include a summons and complaint,
Remes v. Duby, 69 Mich. App. 265, 268, 244 N.W.2d 440, 442 (1976); a subpoena, Board
of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., 46 A.D.2d 794, 796, 360 N.Y.S.2d
922, 924, aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975); a writ of gar-
nishment, Nagy v. McBurney, - R.I _. -, 392 A.2d 365 (1978); and even a request
for admission, Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 923, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149
(1976).
33. Generally, no distinction is drawn between perversion of civil process and per-
version of criminal process. Sachs v. Levy, 316 F. Supp. 44, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ("[T]he
question of whether the proceedings utilized were civil or criminal is not the determining
issue . . . "). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977); 1 AM. JuR. 2D
Abuse of Process §§ 1, 13, 14 (1962); Annot., 97 A.L.R.3D 688, 691 (1980).
34. Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. , -, 605 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1980). See
also Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. _ -, 615 P.2d 957, 960 (1980). But see Drago v.
Buonagurio, 61 A.D.2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413
N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978)(no liability for abuse of process, negligence, malicious prosecution or
"prima facie tort," although physician sued for medical malpractice had not even treated
25
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party who owed no money;s 5 in the use of criminal or civil pro-
ceedings to coerce a person to relinquish money,36 bonds,3 7 or
any other property;38 and in the issuance of a writ directing the
sale of real estate valued far in excess of the amount of the debt
owed, which resulted in the sale of the property.3 " At least one
court has held that the use of force in the service of a summons
and complaint can be a perversion of legal process.40
C. Injury to Plaintiff
Finally, a plaintiff in an abuse of process action must prove
that he has been injured by the earlier action.41 Generally, a
deceased for fatal illness).
35. Little v. Sowers, 167 Kan. 72, 77, 204 P.2d 605, 608 (1949) (misuse of civil
process).
36. Huggins v. Winn Dixie, Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 212, 153 S.E.2d 693, 696
(1967)(misuse of criminal process, discussed in Annot., 27 A.L.R.3D 1195 (1980). Accord,
Voytko v. Ramada Inn, 445 F. Supp. 315, 324-25 (D.N.J. 1978)(misuse of criminal pro-
cess to force payment by plaintiffs of hotel bill not owed).
37. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780, 786-87 (1947)(misuse of
criminal process).
38. E.g., Ash v. Cohen, 119 N.J.L. 54, 56, 194 A. 174, 175 (1937)(chattels); Adelman
v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 389, 3 A.2d 15, 16 (1938)(household goods).
39. Haggerty v. Moyerman, 321 Pa. 555, 558-59, 184 A. 654, 655 (1936). The debt
was only one hundred dollars while the property was valued at thirteen hundred dollars.
Id. at 558-59, 184 A. at 655.
40. Remes v. Duby, 69 Mich. App. 265, 269, 244 N.W.2d 440, 442 (1976)(plaintiff
alleged that the two process servers used force to enter the plaintiff's house to serve a
summons and complaint). A further illustration of abuse of process involving a form of
the use of force is stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
A, an attorney to whom C has entrusted the collection of a debt owed by B,
assigns C's claim to D, who resides some distance from B. In accordance with
A's instructions, D brings an action as assignee and causes a subpoena to issue
at a time when it is extremely inconvenient for B to appear, A's purpose being
to force B to pay the claim rather than to undergo the inconvenience of ap-
pearance. B not appearing, A causes a bench warrant to issue for his arrest
under which B is fined and execution against his body is ordered. Before this
order is carried out, B brings his action against A. A is subject to liability to B
for abuse of process.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 682, comment a, Illustration 1 (1977).
41. E.g., Ingo v. Koch, 127 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1942). See 3 J. DOOLEY, supra note
17, § 41.13; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 121; 1 AM. Jur. 2D Abuse of Process § 25 (1963).
Some courts require proof that the defendant's actions have resulted in a seizure of the
plaintiff's person or property, Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1963), Ewert
v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 38 Ill. App. 3d 42, 347 N.E.2d 242 (1976); John Allan Co. v.
Brandow, 59 Ill. App. 2d 328, 207 N.E.2d 339 (1965); while some others require the plain-
tiff to prove that he has been forced to do something he would not otherwise have to do,
or that he has been forced to refrain from performing a permissible act. Fox v. Issler, 77
26
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plaintiff may recover for all actual damage he suffers that is
proximately caused by the abuse, "including any special or pecu-
liar damage" that can be established.41 The loss may be
financial,43 emotional,4 4 physical,45 or in the nature of injury to a
business"6 or other property.
47
A plaintiff who can establish that a prior action was moti-
vated by actual malice may also recover punitive damages. 48 Ac-
tual malice requires a showing that the conduct of the defen-
dant, who was the plaintiff in the prior action, "was willful,
intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible conse-
quences." 49 Courts have awarded punitive damages in cases in
which an attorney instituted a lawsuit without investigating the
facts of the case, 50 in which property exempt from execution was
seized for the purpose of breaking up the plaintiff's business,51
and in which witnesses were subpoenaed for a hearing for the
A.D.2d 860, 862, 431 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (1980); Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21, 23, 521 P.2d
964, 968 (1974). See also R. MAI=EN & V. LnVrr, supra note 18, § 46 (1977). This only
confuses the matter, however, and "any completed use of the process which involves an
interference with the (plaintiff's) right will necessarily involve such damage." W. PRos-
SER, supra note 1, § 121. See also Note, Counterclaiming for Malicious Prosecution and
Abuse of Process: Washington's Response to Unmeritorious Civil Suits, 14 WILAMEr
L. REv. 401, 410 n.80 (1978).
42. Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App.._, , 605 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1980). See
also Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 46 A.D.2d 794, 360
N.Y.S.2d 922, afl'd, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975)(plaintiff
allowed to recover expense of hiring 87 substitute teachers); 1 AM. JuR. 2D Abuse of
Process § 25 (1963).
43. E.g., Voytko v. Ramada Inn, 445 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1978); Board of Educ. v.
Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 46 A.D.2d 794, 360 N.Y.S.2d 922, af'd, 38
N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
44. Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. , 615 P.2d 957, 960 (1980) ("The compensatory
damages recoverable in an action for abuse of process ... include compensation for
fears, anxiety, mental and emotional distress.").
45. McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 184, 134 A. 810, 815 (1926). See also 72 C.J.S.
Process § 12 4 (y) (1952).
46. Juchter v. Boehm & Co., 67 Ga. 534, overruled on other grounds, Wilcox v. Mc-
Kenzie, 75 Ga. 73 (1886).
47. Id. See also Saliem v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402, 172 A. 4 (1934); Malone v. Belcher,
216 Mass. 209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913); Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. 190 (1865).
48. Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. -_, . 615 P.2d 957, 961 (1980) (malice could be
inferred from defendant's conduct); Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. .... , , 605
S.W.2d 242, 245 (1980). See generally 1 AM. JuR. 2D Abuse of Process § 26 (1963).
49. Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. , _ 615 P.2d 957, 961 (1980).
50. Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. - 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980).
51. Coleman & Newsome v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132 (1876).
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primary purpose of harassing their employer.52
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDY AGAINST ATTORNEYS
For an attorney to be held liable for an abuse of process, the
acts complained of must be his own acts53 or acts of others that
are "wholly instigated and carried on" by the attorney.5' Al-
though some attorney's acts may be protected by the absolute
privilege "to publish false and defamatory matter of another in
communications... during the course and as a part of the judi-
cial proceeding, if it has some relation thereto,"55 this immunity
does not bar an action for abuse of process. 56 Notwithstanding
the nature of the particular abuse alleged, when attorneys are
sued for abuse of process, the courts must balance the interests
and policies that militate against holding the attorney liable
against those policies that favor the imposition of liability.
A. Considerations Opposing Liability
The nature of the adversary system provides a sound reason
for drastically limiting the liability of attorneys for abuse of pro-
cess. As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals:
It is axiomatic that the American system of jurisprudence fa-
vors free access to the courts as a medium of dispute settle-
ment. It is the announced policy of this jurisdiction to allow
unfettered access to our courts. In an effort to avoid infringing
upon the right of the public to utilize our courts, we are cau-
52. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 46 A.D.2d 794, 360
N.Y.S.2d 922, aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
53. Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938). See generally
Annot., 97 A.L.R.3D 688 (1980).
54. Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938). See, e.g., Laird v.
Vogel, 334 So. 2d 650 (Fla. App. 1976); Remes v. Duby, 69 Mich. App. 265, 244 N.W.2d
440 (1976).
55. RESTATEMENT OF ToaTS § 586 (1934). This privilege extends even to situations
where the publication was made with actual malice, provided the statement is reasonably
related to the lawsuit. Bradley v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 824-
25, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (1973).
56. See Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974); Hoppe
v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 980 (1947); Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn.
App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980). But see Netterville v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 52,531
(Miss., filed April 29, 1981)(such an absolute immunity extends to persons instituting
disciplinary proceedings, although an attorney who abuses such process may also face
disciplinary action).
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tious not to adopt rules which will have a chilling and inhibi-
tory effect on would-be litigants of justiciable issues.
5
7
This need of potential litigants to have free and open access to
courts is also promoted by the ABA Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which dictates that lawyers "should assist the legal
profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel availa-
ble."58 The Code emphasizes clients' need for assistance in iden-
tifying and resolving their legal problems. 59 An attorney's fear of
exposure to liability for abuse of process as a result of an asser-
tion of a client's claim might undesirably limit free and open
access to the courts.6 0
Apart from an attorney's obligation to assist in making legal
counsel available to the general public, he owes to his own cli-
ents, as their agent, a fiduciary duty of loyalty.61 This duty in-
cludes the obligations to further the clients' best interests "zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law"6 2 and to do all that is
ethically and legally possible on the clients' behalf.6" If courts
routinely imposed upon attorneys liability for abuse of process,
attorneys might be constrained in their zealous representation of
clients. Therefore, attorneys arguably should be liable only for
egregious abuses."
57. Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 197-98 (D.C. 1980). See also Note, Counter-
claiming for Malicious Prosejution, supra note 41, at 401.
58. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY, Canon 2 (1978). See also Freed-
man, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 191 (1978)
("The lawyer, by virtue of his or her training and skills, has a legal and practical monop-
oly with respect to access to the legal system and knowledge about the law.").
59. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RsPoNsmiLrry, EC 2-1 (1978) states that "[t]he
need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their legal
problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the
services of acceptable legal counsel."
60. See, e.g., Drago v. Buonagurio, 89 Misc.2d 171, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61, rev'd, 61 A.D.2d
282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, order aff'd, 46 N.Y.S.2d 780, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910, 386 N.E.2d 821
(1978); DiSanti v. Russ Financial Co., 251 Pa. Super. 184, 380 A.2d 439 (1977).
61. F. MEECHAM, OUTLINES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 76 (4th ed. 1952); Note, Attor-
neys' Liability, supra note 1, at 792-93.
62. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmiLITY, EC 7-1 (1978). See Friedman v.
Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978). It is the "duty of the advocate... to
be zealous and the public is charged with that knowledge." Id. at 433, 268 N.W.2d at
675.
63. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY, EC 7-1; EC 7-4; DR 7-
101(A)(1) (1978). The new ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT (proposed final
draft, May 30, 1981) also emphasize this concern. See Rule 1.2(a).
64. See Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 1, at 775.
1981]
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B. Considerations Favoring Liability
Misuse of legal procedure is a serious offense; "when a party
abuses process, his tortious conduct injures not only the in-
tended target, but [it] offends the spirit of the legal procedure
itself."65 A groundless suit causes harm to another without "eco-
nomic or social excuse or justification. 6 6 That a victim of such a
suit should suffer the time, expense, and embarrassment 7 of un-
necessary litigation without recourse seems basically unfair.68 A
right of recourse against the guilty party arguably should not be
denied simply because that party is an attorney.6 9
Furthermore, abuse of legal process wastes the time and en-
ergy of the courts. Although free and open access to the courts is
a desirable objective, legal process must "be utilized in a manner
consonant with the purpose for which that procedure was
designed. '70 An attorney's abuse of process not only fails to
"avoid ...the appearance of . . .impropriety" 71 but violates
his oath as an attorney 2 and the public duty he owes as an of-
ficer of the judicial system.7 . In addition, this conduct consti-
tutes a violation of the attorney's duty to represent clients
"within the bounds of the law."'7 4 Conduct of this type deni-
grates the judicial system and should not be condoned. 5
65. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 404,
343 N.E.2d 278, 281, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 640 (1975), aff'g, 46 A.2d 794, 360 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1974).
66. Id. at 403, 343 N.E.2d at 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
67. Injury can result in other ways such as loss of reputation and emotional strain.
Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. , -, 605 S.W.2d 242, 244 (1980).
68. Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. , 615 P.2d 957 (1980); Peerman v. Sidicane, -
Tenn. App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980). See Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 1, at
775.
69. See, e.g., Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980) ("We are likewise cogni-
zant of our obligations to protect the innocent against frivolous litigation and to make
victims of groundless lawsuits whole where they suffer special injury as the result of the
suit."); Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. -, 615 P.2d 957 (1980)(client did not know about or
authorize the attorney to appeal a frivolous malpractice action).
70. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 404,
343 N.E.2d 278, 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975), afg, 46 A.D.2d 794, 360 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1974).
71. Id. at 404, 343 N.E.2d at 282, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
72. Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21, 28, 521 P.2d 964, 969 (1974).
73. Id. See Note, Counterclaiming for Malicious Prosecution, supra note 41, at 411.
74. ABA CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL REsPoNsmirry, Canon 7 (1980). See also id., DR 2-
109, 7-102, EC 7-4, 7-10.
75. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 400-
[Vol. 33
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss2/7
1981] ABUSE OF PROCESS
C. The Judicial Response
In striking an appropriate balance between conflicting poli-
cies, courts have found the considerations militating against im-
position of liability on attorneys to be more persuasive than
those martialed for imposition.78 In light of the exigencies of our
adversary system, it may be appropriate, particularly in close
cases, that courts faced with conduct other than that which is
egregious and deplorable have seldom held attorneys liable for
abuse of process.7 When an attorney's conduct is particularly
offensive, however, liability should be found. Nevertheless, sev-
eral courts have declined to find liability in cases in which an
attorney's conduct has appeared egregious.78
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial leniency in this area may lead to unjustifiable and
perplexing results. Innocent persons, who would otherwise be
made whole again, may be denied a remedy simply because their
injury has been caused by attorneys. Therefore, in their at-
tempts to avoid the possible chilling effect that imposition of lia-
bility in abuse of process cases would have on attorneys' zealous
representation of their clients, courts should be wary of
overcompensating by allowing attorneys to avoid liability even
when their conduct is outrageous.
01, 343 N.E.2d 278, 281, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 640.
76. See generally Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Pa. 1963); Morowitz v. Mar-
vel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Geier v. Jordan, 107 A.2d 440 (D.C. 1954); Fox v. Issler, 77
A.D.2d 860, 431 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1980). But see Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 853, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 874 (1963); Voytko v. Ramada Inn, 445
F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1978); Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1974).
77. See, Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Cartwright v. Wexler, Wex-
ler & Heller, Ltd., 53 IMI. App.3d 983, 369 N.E.2d 185 (1977); Tricomi v. Tricomi, 192
Misc. 763, 81 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1948).
78. E.g., Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910
(1978)(a physician who was sued for wrongful death was denied recourse against his op-
ponent's attorney although he had never treated the deceased); Nagy v. McBurney, 392
A.2d 365, 367 (R.I. 1978)(court held that a jury could reasonably infer that an attorney
had no ulterior motive when he had attached more than twice the amount of money he
was owed by the plaintiff after allegedly having told him, "You dirty son-of-a-bitch, you
took me before the Bar Association, I'm going to attach your pay at any time I want, for
any amount I want. . . . "). For recent cases in which recovery was permitted on the
basis of an attorney's egregious conduct, see Bull v. McCuskey, - Nev. -, 615 P.2d
957 (1980); Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980).
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As officers of the court, attorneys are required to avoid con-
duct that abuses the legal process 9 and should be sanctioned for
engaging in such conduct. Although it may be appropriate to
avoid imposing liability on attorneys in close cases, courts
should be less hesitant to impose liability in those cases in which
an attorney has intentionally or recklessly misused legal process.
This circumscribed imposition of liability on attorneys for the
tort of abuse of process, if consistently applied, could enhance
the professional conduct of the members of the legal
community.80
William E. Salter, III
79. See notes 70-74 supra.
80. See R. WisE, LEGAL ETHICS 16 (2d ed. 1970).
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IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Defamation is comprised of the torts of slander and libel,
the former oral and the latter written.1 Dean Prosser has defined
defamation as "that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or con-
fidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derog-
atory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him."2
In fulfillment of their ethical obligation to represent clients
"zealously within the bounds of the law,"3 attorneys have fre-
quent occasion to make statements that may be defamatory re-
garding third parties. Although a form of judicial immunity pro-
tects attorneys from liability for relevant defamatory statements
made on their own behalf, defamatory statements outside the
scope of client representation are not protected. Cause for con-
cern arises with the realization that attorneys can, in the course
of a client representation, make defamatory statements that im-
munity may not protect. This section of the project will examine
the scope and underlying policy of the immunity that protects
lawyers from liability for defamation and will consider sanctions
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Id. 739 (citing G. BowR, THE LAW OF ACTIONABLE DEFAmATON 4 (2d ed. 1923);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1934)). Accord, Capps v. Watts, 271 S.C. 276, 281, 246
S.E.2d 606, 609 (1978).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has noted that "[s]lander is commonly defined
as 'the speaking of base or defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business, or means of livelihood."' Beane v. Weisan Co., 5 N.C.
App. 276, 278, 168 S.E.2d 236, 237 (1969).
The South Carolina Supreme Court has defined libel as
a malicious defamation expressed either by writing or printing, or by signs,
pictures, effigies, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead
or to impeach the honesty or integrity or reputation, or publish the natural or
alleged defects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred,
contempt, ridicule, or obliquy, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or to
injure him in his office, business, or occupation.
Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 230 S.C. 304, 307, 95 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1956)(citations
omitted).
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7, DR 7-101 (1977).
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against defamatory statements by attorneys incorporated in the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
II. POLICY UNDERLYING IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR
DEFAMATION
The law of defamation protects the right to reputation,4 but
attitudes toward reputation are subject to changing moral and
social values. Consequently, while judicial redress for harm to
reputation is an ancient element of the law, the action for defa-
mation has historically reflected social and political influences
that are quite distinct from considerations of the right to repu-
tation,5 and courts have manifested an inconsistent commitment
to protecting the right to reputation in specific circumstances.6
4. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
5. Toward the end of the middle ages, the common-law courts contended vigorously
with the ecclesiastical courts in England for control of the jurisdiction over defamation
suits. See generally I. PLUCKNETT, A CoNcIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 491 (5th ed.
1956). The first step in this process was the issuance of writs of prohibition to the eccle-
siastical courts in actions for defamation that imputed crime, actionable in the common-
law courts, to the defamed party. Id. at 492. This step probably was the genesis of the
contemporary rule that slanderous statements imputing crime may afford recovery with-
out proof of the special damages occasioned by them. See Veeder, The History and The-
ory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. Rv. 546, 560 n.1 (1903). See generally W.
PRossER, supra note 1, § 112, at 754. The converse rule that special damages must be
shown in order to recover for slander apparently arose out of another stage of this battle
for jurisdiction. In order to augment their jurisdiction still further, the royal courts char-
acterized defamation as a temporal injury over which the common-law courts had juris-
diction, while the ecclesiastical courts preferred to view defamation as a spiritual injury
to the soul of the defamer. The device seized upon by the royal courts near the end of
the sixteenth century was the reasoning that any plaintiff who could prove ipecial dam-
ages arising from defamation would have adequately proved temporal injury for the pur-
pose of establishing common-law jurisdiction. See L PLUcKNErr, supra, at 493-94. Per-
haps the most important distinction in the law of defamation-that between the written
and the oral forms-emerged from the monarch's suppression of a free press. In order to
specially burden written publication of statements, the law abandoned the requirement
that special damages be shown. Thus liability from written publication of defamatory
statements, called libel, was more easily established than for the oral counterpart. See
generally Veeder, History and Theory, supra, at 561.
6. A heightened standard of proof in defamation cases involving public figures is
illustrated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of the
origin of this standard, see Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and De-
cency, 65 VA. L. Rv. 791 (1979). The common-law courts devised rules to reduce the
number of defamation cases that could be brought within their jurisdiction soon after
they had wrested jurisdiction from the church courts. See I. PLUcKNETT, supra note 5, at
495. Some minimum standard may be maintained to safeguard reputation under all cir-
cumstances, but beyond this level of protection, the law of defamation ordinarily re-
sponds to social conditions. See generally Veeder, History and Theory, supra note 5, at
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When strong policy reasons militate against the imposition of
liability for dafamation, the right to reputation may be expected
to yield to these competing concerns. As one commentator has
observed,
[T]he general doctrine of immunity or privilege for the publi-
cation of defamatory matter in the public interest, or in the
furtherance of the rights or lawful interests of individuals, may
be traced far back in the history of the common law. For it was
at once apparent that the general rule which holds the defamer
to answer for the actual truth of his utterances would be un-
warrantably severe if applied to those, who, in the performance
of public or private duty, or in the legitimate protection of pri-
vate interests, find it necessary to make defamatory
imputations.7
The policy supporting attorneys' immunity for actions
based on defamation is apparent. The public interest is better
served by the resolution of conflict through resort to the judici-
ary than by self help. The potential of the law to achieve this
goal would be restricted if participants in judicial proceedings
were restrained in their pursuit of rights by consideration of po-
tential liability for statements made in the course of the pro-
ceedings. Immunity "has been conceded on obvious grounds of
public policy to insure freedom of speech where it is essential
that freedom of speech should exist." s
Immunities are generally disfavored because they are antag-
onistic to the basic principle that the law should provide relief
for every wrong suffered,9 and, during the past twenty years, a
growing trend toward limiting the scope of immunities has de-
veloped. 10 Nevertheless, immunity from liability for defamatory
statements made in connection with judicial proceedings has re-
sisted substantial erosion in most American jurisdictions."' Al-
546; Note, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 889 (1956).
7. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 CoLum. L. Ray. 463, 464 (1909).
8. Id. at 469.
9. Id. at 467.
10. See 56 WASH. L. REv., 289, 291 n.15 (1981); 33 VAM. L. REv. 775, 776 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945); Bushbaum v. Heriot, 5
Ga. App. 521, 63 S.E. 645 (1909); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 408 A.2d 121
(1979). Some diversity in the rule of immunity exists among the several states, often
because statutory law affects the precise rule applied. See Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y.
440, 445, 121 N.E. 341, 343 (1918). One notable exception to the American consensus in
1981]
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though civil-law jurisdictions do not recognize this immunity, 2
arguments against it are rarely advanced in common-law courts.
Rather, the rationale supporting immunity is ordinarily accepted
without discussion or with the observation that immunity is
founded on a compelling or obvious need.'3
The potential conflict of interest that would result from im-
position upon attorneys of liability for defamatory statements
made in connection with judicial proceedings supports observa-
tions that the immunity is compelling. Attorneys, as agents for
their clients,1 4 owe their clients a duty of loyalty15 and must re-
present their clients' interests "zealously within the bounds of
the law."'" Attorneys, if faced with potential liability for defa-
mation, would find it necessary to balance their clients' interest
in zealous advocacy against their own interests in avoiding de-
famatory statements. 7 Abrogation of immunity from liability for
defamatory statements might well engender a circumspection on
the part of attorneys that would be inimical to the interests of
clients and contrary to the public interest in vigorous legal
assistance.' 8
In order to avoid these results, absolute immunity from lia-
bility for relevant defamatory statements made in connection
favor of absolute immunity occurs in Louisiana where the courts, following the civil-law
tradition, have not accepted the common-law policy justifying immunity. See Lescale v.
Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905).
12. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity, supra note 7, at 463-64.
13. This is not to say that courts always agree about the scope of immunity. See,
e.g., Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 455-56, 371 A.2d 380, 385 (1977); Bradley v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 824-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 721 (1973).
Virtually all courts, however, recognize a compelling need to apply the immunity when
public policy is served. See, e.g., Moore v. Smith, 89 Wash. 2d 932, 936-37, 578 P.2d 26,
29 (1978).
14. F. MECHAM, OUTLINES OP THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 76 (4th ed. 1952).
15. Id.
16. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1 (1977).
17. The lawyer would naturally be concerned about his personal liability incident to
representing a client. Even if this problem could be overcome (by the use of liability
insurance, for example) the lawyer would often find that he was bound either to run the
risk of committing a tort or to violate his duty to represent his client zealously. See
generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Canon 7 (1977). This is particu-
larly true in light of EC 7-3, which states that "[w]hile serving as advocate, a lawyer
should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law." (citation
omitted).
18. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Birmingham, - Mass. App. Ct. -, , 416 N.E.2d 528,
533-34 (1981).
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with judicial proceedings has become a settled rule of law. The
rule is applied to assure attorneys and other participants in judi-
cial proceedings that they may rely upon its protection for all
statements that are relevant and adequately connected to a judi-
cial proceeding. Liability for defamation by such parties is in-
tended to be the exception rather than the rule. 9
Immunity does not belong to lawyers alone but reaches all
legitimate participants in judicial proceedings 0 and applies to a
greater range of suits than merely those arising from defama-
tion.2 1 Because immunity in connection with judicial proceedings
arises from the circumstances in which a defamatory statement
is made, rather than from the source or substance of what is
said,22 it frequently results in the grant of summary judgment
for the defendant in a defamation action.23
Ill. THE SCOPE OF IMMuNrTY
Attorneys are immune from liability for publication of de-
famatory material that, first, is made in connection with a judi-
cial proceeding24 and, second, is relevant to the action.25 All
questions concerning the applicability of immunity must be re-
solved through a determination of whether a particular instance
19. Veeder, Absolute Immunity, supra note 7, at 482-83.
20. See generally W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 114, at 777-78.
21. See Younger v. Soloman, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 296, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120-21
(1974). The immunity in defamation has barred actions for slander of title, e.g.,
Sailboard Key, Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 1979); Wendy's of S. Jersey, Inc.
v. Blanchard Management Corp., 170 N.J. Super. 491, 494, 406 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1979);
actions for negligent misrepresentation, e.g., Portman v. George McDonald Law Corp., 99
Cal. App. 3d 988, 989-93, 160 Cal. Rptr. 505, 506-07 (1979); tortious interference with
business relations, e.g., Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 563-
64, 117 A.2d 889, 895 (1955); and for alleged damage to reputation in a malicious prose-
cution action, e.g., Schier v. Denny, 12 Wis. 2d 544, 548-49, 107 N.W.2d 611, 613 (1961).
22. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity, supra note 7, at 468.
23. See, e.g.; Izzi v. Rellas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 255, 267-68, 13 Cal. Rptr. 689, 695
(1980); Sullivan v. Birmingham, - Mass. App. Ct. 416 N.E.2d 528, 533-34
(1981).
24. The term "absolute", which is frequently used to describe attorneys' immunity,
is in part a vestige of the more nearly absolute version of the law as it has been applied
in England. W. PsossER, supra note 1, § 114, at 778. The continued use of the term
absolute is partially explained by the need to distinguish this immunity from a condi-
tional immunity which applies to defamation made in distinct circumstances. See gener-
ally Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 454-55, 371 A.2d 380, 385 (1977); Bergman v.
Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 749, 221 N.W.2d 898, 899-900 (1974).
25. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977).
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of defamation satisfies this two-prong test.
A. Judicial Proceedings
Immunity protects attorneys from liability for defamation
only when the defamatory statement has been uttered in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding.26 This requirement arises in
part from the goal of preserving truthful communication of facts
in judicial proceedings 27 and is justified by the ability of the
courts to regulate speech incident to judicial proceedings.28 De-
terminations of whether a defamatory statement has been made
in connection with judicial proceedings requires an initial con-
clusion that a judicial proceeding has occurred and then a find-
ing of a sufficient connection between the proceeding and the
defamatory statement.
1. Existence of a Judicial Proceeding.-The Restatement
(Second) of Torts explains that "[j]udicial proceedings include
all proceedings before an officer or other tribunal exercising a
judicial function. 29 Although immunity from liability for defa-
mation ordinarily protects attorneys' statements made in plead-
ings,30 briefs,31 affidavits,32 and oral statements before a court,33
the applicability of immunity in the context of quasi-judicial
hearings, such as administrative or investigative hearings, is less
clear. A commonly employed standard requires that in order for
immunity to apply, a quasi-judicial proceeding must function ei-
ther to resolve issues or to determine the rights of parties.3' Ht
has been suggested that quasi-judicial proceedings should be de-
26. Absolute immunity for defamation may be invoked by an attorney only when
the statement is connected with a judicial proceeding. Id. § 586, comment c.
27. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity, supra note 7, at 470. See also Rainier's Dairies
v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 562, 117 A.2d 889, 894 (1955); Moore v. Smith,
89 Wash. 2d 932, 937, 578 P.2d 26, 29 (1978).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586, comment i (1977). Accord, W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 779 (citing 13 Mo. L. REv. 320 (1948)).
30. E.g., Westridge v. Wright, 466 F. Supp. 234, 236-37 (D.C. Ark. 1979); Cooper-
stein v. Van Natter, 26 Wash. App. 91, 611 P.2d 1332, 1336 (1980).
31. E.g., Passon v. Spritzer, - Pa. Super. Ct. , _, 419 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1980).
32. E.g., Resciniti v. Padilla, 72 A.D.2d 557, 558, 420 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1979).
33. E.g., Sampson v. Rumsey, 1 Kan. App. 2d 191, 194, 563 P.2d 506, 509 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Mock v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 454 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1972);
Toker v. Pollack, 44 N.Y.2d 211, 376 N.E.2d 163, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1977); Lambdin Fu-
neral Servs., Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tenn. 1978). See generally W. PRos-
SER, supra note 1, § 114, at 779-80.
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fined as those with both a purpose of substantial public impor-
tance and the presence of adequate safeguards against unneces-
sary defamation.3 5
The application of immunity from liability for defamatory
statements made in connection with quasi-judicial proceedings
has not been consistent. The New York Court of Appeals has
held that an attorney was not entitled to absolute immunity
from liability for defamatory statements made in connection
with a grand jury proceeding.3 6 Noting "considerable disagree-
ment among the courts on this question, 37 the New York court
concluded that "the communication of a complaint, without
more, does not constitute or institute a judicial proceeding"38
and ruled that absolute immunity "applies only to a proceeding
in court or one before an officer having attributes similar to a
court."3 9 The North Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted the
broader definition of "quasi-judicial" as "[a] term applied to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts,
and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official ac-
tion, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature,"'40 and has
ruled that immunity protects defamatory statements made in
the course of quasi-judicial hearings.4 1 These divergent views on
the availability of immunity in connection with quasi-judicial
hearings leave uncertain the extent to which attorneys may rely
on immunity in this context.
35. See generally 8 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 394-97 (1979).
36. Toker v. Pollack, 44 N.Y.2d 211, 220-21, 376 N.E.2d 163, 166, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6
(1978). The court compared absolute immunity with a qualified privilege, noting that a
qualified privilege, unlike an immunity, does not bar the imposition of liability for defa-
mation. Rather, the qualified privilege negates any presumption of malice in making a
defamatory statement and places the burden of proving malice on the plaintiff. Id. at
219, 376 N.E.2d at 166, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 5. A communication is qualifiedly privileged
when it "is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal
or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in a matter where his interest is con-
cerned." Id. at 219, 376 N.E.2d at 166-67, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (citing Lovell Co. v. Hough-
ton, 116 N.Y. 520, 526, 22 N.E. 1066, 1066-67 (1889)).
37. 44 N.Y.2d at 220, 376 N.E.2d at 167, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
38. Id. at 220, 376 N.E.2d at 167, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
39. Id. at 219, 376 N.E.2d at 167, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (citing Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y.
316, 321, 135 N.E. 515, 516 (1922).
40. Angel v. Ward, 43 N.C. App. 288, 293, 258 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1979)(citing BLACK'S
LAw DIariONARY 1411 (4th ed. rev. 1968)).
41. 43 N.C. App. at 293, 258 S.E.2d at 792.
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Further difficult questions about the applicability of immu-
nity arise when a judicial proceeding is defective. Courts have
withheld immunity for defamatory statements made during a
proceeding over which a court had no jurisdiction. 42 Because im-
munity is accorded to judges for acts undertaken pursuant to a
colorable claim of jurisdiction, 43 it would seem reasonable to ac-
cord immunity to attorneys whenever a court's exercise of juris-
diction has been reasonably mistaken."
2. Sufficient Connection with Judicial Proceedings.-The
requirement of slifficient connection with judicial proceedings
promotes a discriminating application of immunity by limiting
protection to statements that are sufficiently proximate to a ju-
dicial proceeding to permit an inference that they are intended
to promote the interests of justice. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts lists several circumstances that have sufficient connection
with judicial proceedings to justify immunity from liability for
defamatory statements made therein. 5 These circumstances in-
clude the institution of proceedings, conferences and communi-
cations preliminary to such proceedings, and communications
incidental to the preparation and conduct of litigation.4 Immu-
nity has also been applied to protect the maker of defamatory
statements despite the fact that he was collaterally estopped
from litigating the issue to which the statement was related.7
Lack of sufficient connection may be asserted, however, when
the allegedly defamatory statement precedes the institution of a
judicial proceeding to such an extent that it may be doubted
whether the defamation was intended to promote the resolution
of any judicial proceeding.48 Similar doubts arise when the de-
42. E.g., Kent v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 386 So.2d 902, 903-04 (Fla. 1980).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 585, comment f (1977).
44. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1 § 114, at 780.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586, comment d (1977).
46. Id. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 778-79.
47. Passon v. Spritzer, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 419 A.2d 1258, 1260 (1980).
48. In Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (1977), defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment based on the applicability of immunity was denied. The al-
legedly libelous statements appeared in a report written by defendant, a private detec-
tive, for the plaintiff in connection with a divorce action. The report was submitted to
the court in the form of an affidavit, and the court found no adequate connection be-
tween the making of the report and the earlier divorce action because there had been no
adequate showing of intention to engage in litigation at the time the report was made.
The court also noted that an attorney's involvement does not necessarily establish an
adequate connection with a judicial proceeding, because the attorney might simply be
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famatory statement is part of a communication that carries for-
ward the resolution of a suit or action only tangentially. '
An attorney cannot claim the protection of the immunity
when he is acting outside a judicial or quasi-judicial setting.
This is true even when his actions may arguably be professional
in nature; for example, no immunity exists for an attorney's de-
famatory statements made after the conclusion of the litigation
to which they were related.50 The inapplicability of immunity is
still clearer when a defamatory statement has no connection
with a judicial proceeding or was made for reasons unrelated to
the practice of law.51
B. Relevance
Attorneys' immunity from liability for d~famation is also
qualified by a requirement that defamatory statements must be
relevant to the issues presented in a judicial proceeding.52 Al-
though the standard of relevance is expressed differently by va-
rious jurisdictions," the test is a liberal and nontechnical one.
As Justice Cardozo noted in the early years of this century, the
policy of immunity will admit "no room . . . for any strict or
narrow test. Much must be left to the discretion of the advocate.
The privilege embraces anything that may possibly be perti-
nent.' 'M American courts generally follow the liberal test of rele-
vancy,55 but the immunity's application may be regulated by
acting as an adviser. Id. at 458, 371 A.2d at 386.
49. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 98, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962); Sullivan v.
Birmingham, - Mass. App. Ct. -, -, 416 N.E.2d 528, 536 (1981); Troutman v. Er-
landson, 286 Or. 3, 6, 593 P.2d 793, 794 (1979).
50. See e.g., Candelaria v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 786, 789-90, 606 P.2d 196, 199-200
(1980).
51. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
52. RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) OF ToRm § 586 (1977).
53. This requirement of relation to the proceeding has been expressed as necessitat-
ing "some relation to the proceeding," RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977);
"some connection or logical relation to the action," Izzi v. Rellas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 261,
262, 163 Cal. Rptr. 689, 692 (1980)(quoting Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916,
925, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149-50 (1976); "by any view or under any circumstnces ...
considered pertinent to the litigation," Resciniti v. Padilla, 72 A.D.2d 557, 558, 420
N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1979); or "pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether logi-
cally sufficient to obtain it or not," Garrett v. DeWorken, 148 Ga. App. 656, 657, 252
S.E.2d 81, 82 (1979).
54. Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 445, 121 N.E. 341, 343 (1918).
55. See W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 114, at 779.
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statute in specific instances.5"
IV. AVAILABLE SANCTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFAMATION
Despite attorneys' immunity from tort liability for relevant
defamatory statements made in connection with judicial pro-
ceedings, sanctions and penalties other than tort liability do ex-
ist. The policy underlying immunity relies in part on the general
availability in judicial proceedings of alternative remedies:
5
7
"[b]ecause of their extraordinary scope, absolute privileges have
been limited to situations in which authorities have the power
both to discipline persons whose statements exceed the bounds
of permissible conduct and to strike such statements from the
record." 8 Although these remedies may not be available in every
circumstance, 9 the effect of immunity has, nevertheless, thus
been purposely tempered by the availability of other remedies."
Professional discipline and disbarment under the provisions
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility constitute addi-
tional sanctions against attorneys for spurious or abusive defa-
mation. These provisions expressly prohibit attorneys from tak-
ing any "action on behalf of [their] client[s] when [they] know
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to har-
ass or maliciously injure another"' 1 and from "stat[ing] or al-
lud[ing] to any matter that [they have] no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by
56. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 105-709(5) and -710 (1968). See GA. CODE ANN. § 105-
710 (1965)(imposing liability on attorneys for defamatory statements other than those
made in pleadings to a court, upon a showing of malicious intent). California affords
attorneys statutory immunity from liability for defamatory statements made in connec-
tion with judicial proceedings regardless of the relevance of the statements. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 47(2)(West Supp. 1981). California courts have nevertheless applied a relevancy
test. E.g., Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825, 106 CaL
Rptr. 718, 722 (1973); Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 90, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706,
713-14 (1966).
57. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity, supra note 7, at 470.
58. Moore v. Smith, 89 Wash. 2d 932, 937, 578 P.2d 26, 29 (1978).
59. The courts seem increasingly willing to expand immunity and to apply it to pro-
tect statements over which they have little control. See, e.g., Angel v. Ward, 43 N.C.
App. 288, 258 S.E.2d 788 (1979).
60. See Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 562, 117 A.2d
889, 894 (1955).
61. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmurry, DR 7-102(A)(1) (1977).
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admissible evidence. '8 2 Although these rules of conduct do not
provide grounds for civil liability,68 at least one court has ob-
served that "[i]t is... most doubtful that [immunity] could bar
any action found arising out of ethical and disciplinary
considerations.""
V. CONCLUSIN
The nature of the adversary system affords frequent occa-
sions for attorneys to make statements on behalf of their clients
that may be regarded as defamatory. When these statements are
made in connection with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings
and are relevant to issues under consideration, immunity pro-
tects attorneys from tort liability for defamation. Although close
questions may arise in identifying proceedings as judicial or
quasi-judicial and in determining whether a statement is rele-
vant and sufficiently connected with the proceeding, immunity
ordinarily protects attorneys when their statements exhibit a
purpose of furthering the interests of justice. A potential exists
for the employment of disciplinary sanctions when a defamatory
statement has been flagrant, but a lack of precedent in this area
and the unavailability of a civil remedy under the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility suggest that this sanction is not of
great effect.
Clifford F. Altekruse
62. Id., DR 7-106(C)(1).
63. Sullivan v. Birmingham, - Mass. App. Ct. 416 N.E.2d 528, 534 (1981).
64. Id. at , 416 N.E.2d at 534.
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LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE: COVERAGE FOR
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, ABUSE OF
PROCESS, LIBEL, AND SLANDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the majority of actions against attorneys have
been filed by clients who claim that they have been damaged by
the acts, errors, or omissions of their attorneys." Generally, at-
torneys are protected from liability arising from attorney-client
relationships by professional liability insurance: Suits to recover
for the torts discussed in this project-malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, and defamation-do not arise from attorney-
client relationships but instead are brought by third parties: the
defendants in prior suits.2 This section of the project will ex-
amine the extent to which attorneys are covered for third-party
tort liability under their present professional liability insurance
policies and will consider whether additional insurance coverage
should be written that would protect against liabilities not cov-
ered by current policies.
II. COVERAGE UNDER PRESENT POLICIES
A. Scope of Coverage
1. Malicious Prosecution and Defamation.-Lawyers' pro-
fessional liability insurance, often referred to as malpractice in-
surance, covers the acts, errors, or omissions of an attorney in
the performance of professional services. Legal malpractice is
defined as "any professional misconduct whether attributable to
a breach of the standard of care or of the fiduciary obligations."3
The primary elements of legal malpractice are: "(1) a duty owed
1. Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional Liability Claims: The
Search For Facts, 1980 A.B. FoUNDATioN RESEARCH J. 255, 274. See R. MALLEN & V.
LEIvT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 97-125 (1977).
2. R. MALLEN & V. LEviT, supra note 1, at 69-96; Mallen, Recognizing and Defining
Legal Malpractice, 30 S.C.L. REv. 203, 206 (1979). See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 3d 187 (1978).
3. Mallen, Recognizing and Defining Legal Malpractice, supra note 2, at 205 (1979).
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to the injured party arising out of the contract for professional
services, (2) a breach of that duty by failure to exercise profes-
sional skill, and (3) damage caused by the failure to exercise the
requisite skill."'4 Because the torts of malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, and slander are brought by third parties
and are intentional acts of malice,5 they do not fall within this
common definition of malpractice. Most policies, however, do
provide limited coverage for these torts.
Policies underwritten by the American Bankers Insurance
Company of Florida, National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the SYII Guarantee Insurance
Company policies' currently provide coverage for malicious pros-
ecution and defamation. These torts are included in the defini-
tion of personal injury provided by the policies, which
comprehends
(a) false arrest, detention or imprisonment, wrongful entry or
eviction or other invasion of private occupancy, malicious pros-
ecution or humiliation, except when maliciously inflicted by, at
the direction of, or with the consent or acquiescence of the
INSURED;
(b) the publication or utterance of a libel or other defamatory
or disparaging material, . . . except when maliciously pub-
lished or uttered by, at the direction of, or with the consent of
acquiescence of the INSURED. 7
Curiously, this definition specifically excludes malicious acts of
the insured attorney, but provides coverage for malicious prose-
cution and defamation for each of which malice is an element.8
Malice can be of two types: actual and legal. Actual malice,
or malice in fact, implies an intent or desire to cause harm, while
legal malice is presumed from tortious acts, done intentionally
4. Bridgman, Legal Malpractice-A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong
Plaintiff's Case, 30 S.C.L. Rnv. 213, 221 (1979). See generally, Symposium: Legal Mal-
practice, 30 S.C.L. REV. 201 (1979).
5. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, §§ 45, 46, 50; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 113, 115, 120, 121 (4th ed. 1971).
6. Copies of these policies are on file at the office of the South Carolina Law Review.
7. Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy, American Bankers Insurance
Company of Florida, Coverage (Broad Form) (emphasis added). These policies also con-
tain an exclusion for any malicious acts by an attorney. The Potomac Insurance Com-
pany policy does not contain this qualifying language in the definition of personal injury
but does contain the exclusion.
8. See note 5 and accompanying text supra & note 10 infra.
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without cause or excuse, which are reasonably calculated to in-
jure another.9 Generally, either type of malice will support the
tort actions discussed in this project."0
Nevertheless, as illustrated by a recent Flordia decision, the
distinction between actual and legal malice may be critical in
determining the availability of insurance coverage. In Employers
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Kottmeier,n a Florida court
was presented with the question of whether an insurer had a
duty, under policy terms similar to those listed above, to defend
and provide coverage in a suit for slander against an insured.
The court held that the language of the policy should be inter-
preted to provide coverage
for all libel or slander by the insured, except that which is pub-
lished or uttered with actual malice. In other words, even
though the defamatory words may carry with them a presump-
tion of legal malice, coverage is still provided unless it be
shown that the statements were made with actual malice.
12
Under Kottmeier, coverage will be allowed for intentional acts
from which malice may be implied but not for acts committed
'with actual malice or "the specific intent to cause the [resulting]
injury."13 Thus, if an attorney intends, by bringing suit, to cause
a defendant harm and harm actually results, the attorney will be
unable to recover under the policy. If, however, an attorney
prosecutes a claim he considers legitimate but one that a jury
later determines unreasonable, insurance coverage will be af-
forded. This interpretation of the language of the insurance con-
tract appears to give effect to policy terms and to the intent of
9. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 863 (5th ed. 1979).
10. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 771-72. At one time the plaintiff had to prove that
the defendant was "inspired by malice, in the sense of spite or an improper motive" or
actual malice. Today, however, malice is implied by law when the defendant intention-
ally makes a defamatory statement or uses legal process for an improper purpose. Id. at
772.
11. 323 So. 2d 605 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The insurance company attempted to
use the exclusionary language within its definition of personal injury to avoid a duty to
provide coverage and defense. The question of coverage arose when an anesthesiologist
sued a doctor and his insurance company for slander. The company made a motion to
dismiss the claims against it and the doctor filed a cross-claim for specific performance
and a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to a defense.
12. Id. at 606-07.
13. Id. at 607.
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the parties to the contract."' Alternatively, if either type of mal-
ice, actual or legal, were deemed sufficient to exclude coverage, a
policy's express coverage of malicious prosecution, libel, and
slander would be rendered meaningless.
2. Abuse of Proscess.-Because abuse of process is neither
expressly included nor excluded by standard policy terms,15 the
availability of coverage for claims brought under the tort is
largely speculative. Although allegations of malicious prosecu-
tion are similar to allegations of abuse of process and are often
brought in the same lawsuit, the torts are separate and dis-
tinct."' This distinction has led at least two courts17 to hold that
a policy providing coverage for malicious prosecution does not
extend coverage to the tort of abuse of process when the terms
of the policy do not expressly provide this coverage. 8 These
courts concluded that the subject policies' omission of coverage
for abuse of process did not create an ambiguity and that, conse-
quently, the burden of proving coverage rested on the insureds.'
Several considerations militate against the conclusion
reached by these courts. First, lawyers' professional liability pol-
icies should be construed according to the tenets used to inter-
pret other insurance policies, 20 one of which is that an insurance
contract, which is a contract of adhesion, is "strictly construed
against its author. . . . "2 Second, attorneys and the courts fre-
quently confuse abuse of process with malicious prosecution, al-
14. Id. In Levinson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 42 A.D.2d 811, 812, 346 N.Y.S.2d 428,
430 (1973), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that a policy that
excluded intentional acts and included malicious prosecution, libel, and slander within
the coverage inherently created an ambiguity to be resolved against the insurer and that
coverage therefore should be provided. The Kottmeier result, however, is a more accu-
rate reflection of the bargaining intentions of the parties.
15. See note 7 and accompanying text, supra.
16. R. MALLEN & V. Lvmrr, supra note 1, §§ 45, 46, 50.
17. Parker Supply Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 588 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1979) (apply-
ing Alabama law); R.A. Hanson Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 26 Wash. App. 290, 612 P.2d 456
(1980).
18. 588 F.2d at 182-83; 26 Wash. App. at .-, 612 P.2d at 459.
19. 588 F.2d at 182-83; 26 Wash. App. at -, 612 P.2d at 459.
.20. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, § 452.
21. Id. § 452, at 536. Even though an attorney is expected to be sophisticated in his
grasp of contracts, he is unable to negotiate the terms of the coverage with the carrier;
this negotiation is conducted by the state bar association. Therefore, the contract is still
one of adhesion.
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though they are separate torts,22 because both arise from a mis-
use of the legal system.23 Thus, the failure of a policy covering
malicious prosecution to provide for abuse of process arguably
creates an ambiguity24 that should be construed against the in-
surer and in favor of the insured.25 Finally, it may reasonably be
assumed that an attorney and his insurer intend and expect that
a policy provides coverage of both torts.2' Thus, construction of
these contracts to include coverage of abuse of process would
give effect to the expectations of the parties and would avoid a
harsh, unintended result.
27
3. Coverage Under Supplemental and Umbrella Endorse-
ments.-As illustrated above, lawyers' professional liability in-
surance may, pending a favorable interpretation of policy lan-
guage, provide coverage of the torts of malicious prosecution,
defamation, and abuse of process. If a policy is interpreted to
provide coverage but the coverage is insufficient to satisfy a
third party's tort claim, the availability of coverage under sup-
plementary endorsements becomes an important determination.
Generally, if an attorney's malpractice policy fails to afford
22. Malicious prosecution is the institution of an action, without probable cause and
with malice, that terminates favorably for the original defendant. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr,
supra note 1, § 45. Abuse of process is the malicious use of a proper legal process to
accomplish something for which it was not designed. Id. § 46.
23. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, § 46.
24. Of the policies reviewed in the course of preparation of this article, none pro-
vides specific coverage for abuse of process within its terms. The policies reviewed were
those of American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (American Bankers), National
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (National Union), SYR
Guarantee Insurance Company (SYII), and Potomac Insurance Company (Potomac).
The president of the General Agency of Charleston, South Carolina, the agency that
provides the policies endorsed by the South Carolina Bar, stated that these policies
would provide coverage for the tort of abuse of process. Interview with John Cappleman,
President of the General Agency of Charleston (July 19, 1981). Because of the similarity
of the torts and the policies' failure expressly to exclude coverage for abuse of process,
the policies should be declared ambiguous.
25. R. MALLEN & V. L vrr, supra note 1, § 452.
26. Claims for abuse of process are made against insured attorneys and defended by
insurance companies. Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 274. As stated in note 24 supra,
insurance companies might intend their policies to cover abuse of process. Interview,
supra note 24.
27. The policy terms include very similar torts, and abuse of process actions are not
the basis for a significant percentage of the claims made. Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at
274. If the parties intend the policy to cover abuse of process, it would be a harsh result
to declare that such coverage does not exist. See Parker Supply Co., 588 F.2d 180 (5th
Cir. 1979); R.A. Hanson Co., 26 Wash. App. 290, 612 P.2d 456 (1980).
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coverage for malicious prosecution, so will the supplementary or
umbrella coverage he carries. For example, although an attorney
may have, in addition to his malpractice policy, supplementary
liability insurance,28 this supplemental coverage is normally lim-
ited to bodily injury and property damage occurring on the at-
torney's premises or as a result of the operation of an owned or
leased automobile or other vehicle;2 9 supplementary liability in-
surance thus is of no value in the context of third party tort
claims. Similarly, personal umbrella liability policies for law-
yers,30 which usually exclude liability arising from the insured's
profession, and general professional umbrella liability policies,81
which ordinarily expressly exclude lawyers' professional liability,
do not provide coverage for the torts discussed in this project.
Although business umbrella liability endorsements for lawyers32
cover malicious prosecution and defamation, the language used
is essentially the same as that used in lawyers' malpractice poli-
cies. Therefore, these endorsements are unlikely to provide cov-
erage when a malpractice policy will not.3 3
B. Period of Coverage
Apart from showing that a malicious prosecution, defama-
tion, or abuse of process claim is covered by the terms of his
professional liability insurance, an attorney must show that the
claim falls within the policy's period of coverage. American in-
surance companies first entered the professional liability insur-
ance market with the "occurrence" policy.3 This type of policy
28. R. MALLEN & V. LEVrr, supra note 1, app. at 581.
29. Id.
30. Id. app. at 584.
31. The South Carolina Insurance Company, Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy
provides as follows:
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that the insurance af-
forded by this policy shall not apply with respect to liability arising out of any
act, error or omission of the insured, or of any other person for whose acts,
error or omission the insured is legally responsible, in the performance of pro-
fessional services for others in the insureds capacity as a lawyer.
32. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrT, supra note 1, app. at 581.
33. An attorney's homeowner's policy is equally unlikely to provide coverage for
torts against third parties. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lenzmeier, 309 Minn.
134, 139, 243 N.W.2d 153, 156 (1976).
34. Comment, The "Claims Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 925, 926 (1975). Before World War II, no American company wrote law-
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provides coverage for "any acts or omissions that arise during
the policy period, regardless of when claims are made. ' '35 Thus,
under these policies, an insurer is obligated to defend and in-
demnify the insured attorney for his acts or or omissions during
the term of the policy, regardless of when suit is filed against the
attorney.36 Because the exposure period for the insurer under
this type of policy lasts until the statute of limitations has run, 7
leaving the insurer to shoulder the inflated costs of claims made
years after a policy's expiration,38 almost all insurance compa-
nies now write only "claims made" policies.39
A "claims made" policy covers a lawyer's liability arising
out of his professional services for claims40 made during the pol-
icy period even when the acts, errors, or omissions were commit-
ted before the beginning of the policy period.41 The "claims
made" policy limits the insurer's exposure to the period for
which the policy is written.' 2
yers' professional liability insurance; the only coverage available was issued by Lloyd's of
London. Dautch, Lawyers' Indemnity Insurance, 46 CoM. L.J. 412, 412 (1941).
35. Comment, supra note 34, at 926.
36. Id. at 926 n.4.
37. The statute of limitations probably runs from the date of discovery rather than
from the date of occurrence. See, R. MAULEN & V. Lvrr, supra note 1, at 249, 284;
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978, 996 (1968); Comment, supra note 34, at 931.
38. Comment, supra note 34, at 926 n.7 (citing Shand, Is Your Policy on a "Claims
Made" Basis?, WEEKLY UNDERwnrrmE, September 15, 1973, at 8).
39. Stern, An Attorney's Guide for Purchasing Professional Liability Insurance
and Practicing Within the Coverages, 6 OHIo N.U.L. R.v. 680, 681 (1979). See also An-
not., 84 A.L.R.3d 187 (1978).
40. What constitutes a claim is far from clear. Generally, a claim is an assertion of a
right or a demand for money, property or services; it is not a request for information or
an explanation. Hoyt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1979).
See, R. MALLEN & V. Lxvrr, supra note 1, § 406 (West Supp. 1980).
41. The relevant policy language usually provides as follows:
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le-
gally obligated to pay as damages because of any claim or claims, including
claims for personal injury, first made against the insured and reported to the
Company during the policy period, arising out of any act or omission of the
insured in rendering or failing to render professional services for others in the
insured's capacity as a lawyer ... and caused by the insured or any other
person for whose acts or omissions the insured is legally responsible, except as
excluded or limited by the terms, conditions and exclusions of this policy.
Lawyers' Professional Liability Policy, National Union, I. Coverage (Sept. 1980). See R.
MALLEN & V. Lavrr, supra note 1, app.
42. R. MALLEN & V. Lvrr, supra note 1, § 455. An attorney who is leaving the
practice of law may purchase "risk tail" coverage which extends the period of coverage
for reported claims. In effect, this extended reporting period provides the same type of
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An important exclusion in the "claims made" policy denies
coverage for "any acts or omissions occurring prior to the effec-
tive date of this policy if the insured, at the effective date, knew
or could have reasonably foreseen that such acts or omissions
might be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit. '43 The in-
surance company's application form normally requires disclosure
by an attorney and his firm of any prior action that might give
rise to a claim." This requirement could present a problem in
the context of third-party tort claims. The following hypotheti-
cal is illustrative. An attorney files suit on behalf of his client
against the client's doctor on January 1, and the attorney's firm
subsequently purchases a "claims made" policy on June 1. In
February of the following year, the action against the doctor is
tried, and the plaintiff loses. The doctor then sues the plaintiff
and his attorney for malicious prosecution. Would the attorney's
knowledge that the suit was faring poorly when the application
for insurance was made exclude coverage? Would coverage be
excluded if the doctor had threatened the attorney with a law-
suit at the time the first suit was initiated?45 Apparently, no
coverage as an "occurrence" policy. The pertinent policy language provides as follows:
IV. Extended Reporting Period Endorsement In case of cancellation or non-
renewal by either the Named Insured or the Company, the Named Insured
shall have the right, upon payment within thirty (30) days of the termination
of an additional premium, to have issued an endorsement providing an ex-
tended reporting period covering claims first reported during the extended re-
porting period on acts or omissions occurring prior to the end of the Policy
period and otherwise covered by the Policy. The premium shall be equal to
200% of the Named Insured's last annual premium. The premium may be paid
as directed by the Company in writing. If the Company cancels this policy
because the Insured has failed to pay a premium when due or has failed, after
demand, to reimburse the Company such amounts as the Company has paid in
settlement or satisfaction of claims or judgments or for claims expenses in ex-
cess of the applicable limit of liability, or within the amount of the applicable
deductible, the Insured shall not have the right to have such Extended Report-
ing Endorsement issued.
Lawyers' Professional Liability Policy, SYII, IV. Extended Reporting Period Endorse-
ment (June 1980). See, Stern, supra note 39, at 682-83.
43. SYII policy, supra note 42, Exclusions (i).
44. The typical form requires the attorney and his firm to disclose any situations
that they think may give rise to future claims. This disclosure is required by the insur-
ance company to ensure that it does not issue a policy for an act that probably will result
in a future claim. The effect is to prevent attorneys from buying coverage for acts al-
ready committed but not insured against.
45. The practical problem in such a situation is determining when an attorney
should reasonably foresee that an act or omission will give rise to a claim. This is a
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courts have yet considered this problem in relation to "claims
made" policies. Courts considering analogous problems with oc-
currence policies have reached inconsistent conclusions.46
C. Extent of Coverage
1. Duty to Defend.-An important feature in professional
liability insurance coverage is the provision that the insurance
company is bound to "defend any suit against the insured alleg-
ing such act or omission and seeking damages which are payable
under the terms of this policy, even if any of the allegations of
the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent. . . ."u A good de-
fense can be costly; thus the duty to defend is a vital part of the
professional liability policy. Because rules governing the duty to
defend vary among jurisdictions, an attorney should be aware of
the rule within the jurisdiction in which he practices.
To determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend an
action brought against its insured, a court will look first to the
plaintiff's pleadings to determine whether the claim falls within
the terms of the policy.4 '8 If the pleadings advance several theo-
difficult question that should turn upon the facts of each situation; however, if it appears
that no fraud is involved, coverage should be provided.
46. In Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 95 N.J. Super. 564,
232 A.2d 168 (1967), for example, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey held that the essence of the tort of malicious prosecution is the issuance of the
complaint, and concluded that coverage was excluded under an occurrence policy be-
cause the act giving rise to liability, the original complaint, occurred before the issuance
of the policy, even though the favorable termination occurred later. Id. at 576, 232 A.2d
at 175. The court in Roess v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.
Fla. 1974), reached the opposite result. Accord, Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harbor Ins.
Co., 65 IlM. App. 3d 198, 382 N.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Ill.2d 446, 397
N.E.2d 839 (1979). In Roess, the United States District Court of Florida held that a
cause of action for malicious prosecution did not accrue until the first suit was termi-
nated. Roess, 383 F. Supp. at 1235. The court also stated that because the first suit was
on appeal when the policy was purchased by the insured, it had not terminated favorably
when the policy was issued. Thus, the act or omission that gave rise to a claim had not
occurred before the effective date of the policy. As a result, the insurer would be liable
for failing to provide a defense and would be required to provide coverage under the
terms of the policy if the insured did not fraudulently conceal the fact that the first law
suit was pending. 383 F. Supp. at 1237. See also Arant v. Signal Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d
516, 516, 136 Cal. Rptr. 689, 690 (1977) (holding that damages against the insured accrue
at the time of the occurrence of an accident within the meaning of an indemnity policy).
47. Conner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770, 773 (Okla. 1972).
48. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURaNCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4683 (Berdal ed. 1979). See R.
A. Hanson Co., 26 Wash. App. 290, -, 612 P.2d 456, 457 (1980).
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ries of liability,4" or, if the claim is potentially within the policy
terms, the insurer has a duty to defend.50 When the allegations
of the complaint are partially within and partially outside the
terms of the policy, the insured is usually required to defend the
suit.51 Clearly, no duty to defend exists if all of the allegations of
the complaint fall outside the terms of the policy coverage.52
Generally, an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its
duty to pay,5 3 and most courts will resolve any doubt about cov-
erage and ambiguities in the complaint in favor of the insured.54
An example of liberal construction of pleadings in found in Con-
ner v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,55 in which the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held that any "words of exclusion [within a
policy] are to be narrowly viewed and its words of inclusion are
to be broadly viewed."56 Applying this rule, the court held a
duty to defend exists until all acts or omissions of the insured
are adjudged to fall within the exclusions of the policy. 57 Thus,
even though the conduct alleged in the complaint falls within
the exclusionary terms of the policy, the duty to defend ceases
only when the insured's conduct is in fact excluded from cover-
age.58 Other courts, following what appears to be the majority
49. Continental Cas. Co. v. Reinhardt, 247 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D. Or. 1965).
50. R. A. Hanson Co., 26 Wash. App. at -, 612 P.2d at 459; 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 48, §§ 4683, 4684.01.
51. Stevens v. Home, 325 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). This rule might
be used to provide coverage for abuse of process if the complaint also contained allega-
tions of malicious prosecution.
52. C.O. Morgan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 521 S.W.2d 318, 322
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975); 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, §§ 4684.01, 4685.
53. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4684; R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, §
452.
54. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4683; R. MALLEN & V. L.vrr, supra note 1, §
452.
55. 496 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1972).
56. Id. at 774.
57. Id. at 775. See 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4683.01.
58. The facts of Conner show that the suit brought against the insured was ground-
less, though within the exclusion of the policy. The plaintiff in the original suit had
entered voluntary bankruptcy proceedings and subsequent to these proceedings sued
over thirty-five defendants including the insured, "Internal Revenue officials, judges,
The Governor, bankers and other lawyers . . . " 496 P.2d at 771. A professional buys
professional liability insurance to protect his reputation and business. The insurer sells a
duty to defend an attorney's reputation. The policy stated that the insured would defend
any suit, even if groundless, payable under the terms of the policy. 496 P.2d at 773. If it
appears the conduct alleged is within the exclusion but is probably groundless, the in-
surer should be required to defend. Donnelly v. Transportation Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761
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position, have held that allegations of fact that, as stated, fall
within the exclusionary clause excuse the insurer from its duty
to defend.59 Because insurance covers only those "damages
which are payable under the terms of [the] policy," 0 Conner ap-
pears to strain the plain meaning of policy language.
2. Coverage for Punitive Damages.-Standard lawyers'
professional liability insurance policies exclude coverage for pu-
nitive damages.8 1 Some jurisdictions do, however, allow insur-
ance against punitive damages, and in those states, an attorney
may purchase this additional coverage. 2
3. Persons Covered.-Professional liability insurance poli-
cies ordinarily cover the attorney or partnership named as the
insured within the policy,63 including attorneys who join or leave
(4th Cir. 1979).
59. Battisti v. Continental Cas. Co., 406 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1969); Grieb v. Citizens
Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 552, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967).
60. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 7.6(a), at 476 (1971); 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note
48, § 4684.01.
61. The American Bankers policy states that: "1. This Policy Does Not Apply...
(h) to punitive or exemplary damages. . . ." American Bankers policy, supra note 7,
Exclusions 1(h). All other policies examined have the same or a similar exclusion.
62. For further discussion of this topic see notes 79 to 88 and accompanying text
infra.
63. Heffernan, Professional Malpractice Insurance: Let the Attorney Beware, 48
CONN. B.J. 347, 352 (1974). Under the "Persons Insured" clause of the SYU policy, the
following are defined as being the insured:
I. Persons Insured:
Each of the following is an Insured under this insurance to the extent set forth
below-.
(a) if the Named Insured designated in the schedule is an individual, the
person so designated, but only with respect to the conduct of a law practice of
which the individual is the sole proprietor;
(b) if the Named Insured designated in the Schedule is a partnership, the
partnership so designated and any lawyers who are partners thereof;
(c) if the Named Insured designated in the schedule is a Professional Cor-
poration or Professional Association, the Professional Corporation or Profes-
sional Association so designated and any lawyers who are stockholders or mem-
bers thereof;
(d) any lawyer who is an employee of the Named Insured;
(e) any lawyer who previously qualified as an Insured under subpara-
graphs I(b), (c) or (d) of this Policy prior to termination of the required rela-
tionship with the Named Insured, but only for professional services rendered
prior to termination of such relationship;
(f) any partnership, professional corporation or professional association of
which the Named Insured is the successor.
SYII policy, supra note 7, Insuring Agreements I(a)-(f).
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a firm during the period of the policy. 4 Coverage of secretaries,
paralegals, law clerks, process servers, and runners who usually
are not among the "named insured" is less certain, but the typi-
cal policy's extension of coverage to "any person for whose acts,
errors or omissions the Insured is legally responsible.. .,"6 may
include these employees. Nevertheless, an attorney probably
should consider additional coverage for all employees if it is
available."6
A question of policy coverage may arise when a member of a
firm commits an act, clearly excluded by the terms of the firm's
policy, that implicates other members of the firm who did not
participate in the act. Will insurance coverage extend to nonpar-
ticipant members and the firm? 67 This question usually will be
answered in the affirmative. Professional liability policies nor-
mally contain a waiver of exclusions, which states that any mem-
ber of the partnership who does not consent or acquiesce to an
excluded act remains covered.6 8 Thus, even though coverage of
64. Id.; R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, § 457. Notification of changes within a
firm must be forwarded to the insurer within a specified time. The American Bankers
policy states:
3. Firm Changes: Any changes among the partners or stockholders of the
Named Insured, even though it results in changes in the name or business style
of the firm, shall not effect this insurance but such change shall be reported to
the Company promptly within 60 days and in no event later than the next
anniversary date of the policy.
American Bankers policy, supra note 7, The Insured, cl. 3. See R. MALLEN & V. LEIT,
supra note 1, § 457.
65. American Bankers policy, supra note 7, Coverage, cl. 1(a).
66. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, § 457.
67. Partners within a partnership are liable for the acts, errors and omissions of
each other. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPMTIONS § 22 (2d ed. 1970).
68. The National Union term states:
III. Waiver of Exclusion and Breach of Conditions
Whenever coverage under any provisions of this policy would be excluded,
suspended or lost
(a) because of any exclusion or condition relating to dishonest, fraudulent,
malicious or criminal acts or omissions by any insured or employee of an in-
sured and with respect to which any other insured did not personally partici-
pate or personally acquiesce or remain passive after having personal knowledge
thereof, or
(b) because of noncompliance with any condition relating to the giving of
notice to the Company with respect to which any other insured shall be in
default solely because of the default or concealment of such default by one or
more partners or employees responsible for the loss or damage otherwise in-
sured hereunder;
the Company agrees that such insurance as would otherwise be afforded under
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the attorney who committed the act is precluded, the insurer
must still defend and indemnify the firm.
III. SHOULD MORE PROTECTIVE COVERAGE BE WRITTEN?
Assuming that a malicious prosecution, defamation, or
abuse of process claim falls clearly within a policy's period of
coverage and that the attorney-defendant is a named insured in
the policy, several substantial problems remain regarding insur-
ance recovery for third-party tort liability. First is the problem
of policy construction: whether abuse of process is covered even
though not expressly included in professional liability policies
and whether a policy's exclusion of malicious acts includes con-
duct motivated by actual malice, legal malice, or both. Because
malicious prosecution, defamation, and abuse of process are in-
tentional torts,69 a second problem faced by attorney-defendants
in these actions is their uninsured exposure to punitive damages.
These problems raise the question of whether additional, more
protective insurance should be written. The answer to this ques-
tion is largely a matter of public policy.
That public policy will not allow a wrongdoer to insure
against his intentional acts is an accepted rule.70 Public policy,
however, permits a person to insure against acts of legal malice
or intentional acts that cause unintentional results.71 Attorneys
this policy shall continue in effect, cover and be paid with respect to each and
every insured who did not personally commit or personally participate in com-
mitting or personally acquiesce in or remain passive after having personal
knowledge of one or more of the acts or omissions described in any such exclu-
sion or condition; provided that if the condition be one with which such in-
sured can comply, after receiving knowledge thereof, the insured entitled to
the benefit of this Waiver of Exclusions and Breach of Conditions shall comply
with such condition promptly after obtaining knowledge of the failure of any
other insured or employee to comply therewith.
National Union policy, supra note 41, Conditions; I. Waiver of Exclusion and Breach of
Conditions.
69. These torts are "intentional" in the sense that they require an element of mal-
ice. See notes 3-14 and accompanying text supra.
70. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633
(5th Cir. 1979); 9 R. ANDERSON, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 39:15 (1962 & Supp. 1980).
But see Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); City of Newark
v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 546, 342 A.2d 513, 517-18
(1975).
71. Kottmeier, 323 So.2d 605, 607 (Fi. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 48, § 4501.14 at 286-87.
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may therefore insure themselves against intentional acts of mali-
cious prosecution7 2 and defamation7 3 that are committed "with-
out intent to harm. '7 4 This rule should be equally applicable to
coverage for abuse of process. 75 Thus, attorneys should be able
to purchase insurance coverage for those circumstances where
their zealous pursuit of what they believe to be a legitimate
claim is later determined to have been unreasonable by a jury in
a malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of process
action.78
This approach allows an attorney to represent his client
without having to make the Hobson's choice between potentially
incurring liability to his own client for failing to name a third
party who may be liable or incurring liability to the third party
for improperly naming him in a suit.77 It should be noted, how-
ever, that the traditional rule of public policy-that a wrongdoer
cannot insure against his intentional acts-probably will pre-
clude insurance coverage for third-party torts motivated by ac-
tual malice or intent to cause the resulting harm. Nevertheless,
allowing insurance coverage for the torts discussed in this pro-
ject when the standard of liability is legal malice would serve
another public policy-ensuring clients' access to court even for
those claims that are more likely to generate actions against
72. 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4501.14 at 288.
73. Id. at 286-88.
74. Kottmeier, 323 So. 2d at 607; 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4501.14.
75. See notes 15-27 and accompanying text supra.
76. Another public policy question is presented by the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility's prohibition of an attorney's bringing an action that will maliciously injure an-
other. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONA REsPONsmILrrY, DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980).
Should an attorney be allowed to purchase insurance for an act that is clearly in viola-
tion of the Code? This question should be resolved with the same reasoning discussed
above. If the attorney acts intentionally but without the intent to cause the resulting
harm, he should be able to purchase insurance coverage. See notes 71-74 and accompany-
ing text supra.
77. But see Comment, Attorney Liability for Malicious Prosecution and Legal Mal-
practice: Do They Overlap? 8 PAc. L.J. 897, 907-911 (1977). The author of that comment
concludes that there is no danger of an overlap between malpractice and malicious prose-
cution. In view of the rising number of suits brought for malicious prosecution and the
higher likelihood of such a suit being successful, this view should be reassessed. See
Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. _, 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980); Note, Malicious Prosecu-
tion Liability of Plaintiff's Counsel for an Unwarranted Medical Malpractice
Suit-New Developments in Physician Countersuits for Unfounded Medical Malprac-
tice Claims, 7 N. Ky. L. REv. 265 (1980).
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their attorneys.7 8
Jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether it is against
public policy for a wrongdoer to insure against punitive dam-
ages.7 1 Several courts have reasoned that insurance coverage
defeats the purposes of an award of punitive dam-
ages-punishment of wrongdoers and deterrence of similar be-
havior by others- --80 and is therefore void as against public pol-
icy.81 Other courts,82 however, have reached the opposite
conclusion. These courts have recognized that denying insurance
for punitive damages can work a hardship on businesses and
professional persons by exposing them to liability in situations
when a jury may infer malice from intentional conduct that re-
sults in unintended injury; 3 that insuring against punitive dam-
ages does not shift the burden of punishment to the insurance
company because the company may charge higher rates for such
coverage;84 that parties should be free to contract; and that only
when the "common sense of the entire community would so pro-
nounce it," 85 should a contract be precluded by public policy.88
The latter position seems reasonable in the context of third-
party tort claims against attorneys. Because attorneys are re-
quired to provide zealous representation of their clients, they
should be free to obtain insurance coverage against punitive
damages to protect themselves against the unintended results of
78. Peerman, - Tenn. App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242, illustrates that the odds of a physi-
cian recovering against an attorney for malicious prosecution are increasing. If attorneys
must fear liability in these situations, which is the result desired by physicians, they will
be more hesitant to bring close cases.
79. Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTmGS L.J. 431
(1976).
80. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432,440 (5th Cir. 1962); Note,
supra note 79, at 440.
81. E.g., McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440. See Note, supra note 79, at 440; Annot., 20
A.L.R.3d 343, 347 (1968).
82. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359
(1978); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964)(leading case allowing insurance coverage of punitive damages). See Annot., supra
note 81, at 350-51.
83. First Nat'l Bank, 283 Md. at 236, 389 A.2d at 363-64 (quoting Harrell v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 209-11, 567 P.2d 1013, 1018-19 (1977)).
84. 283 Md. at 237, 389 A.2d at 364 (quoting Harrell, 279 Or. at 213, 567 P.2d at
1019).
85. 283 Md. at 238, 389 A.2d at 364 (quoting In re Trust Estate of Woods, Weeks &
Co., 52 Md. 520, 536 (1879)).
86. 283 Md. at 238, 389 A.2d at 364.
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their actions during such representation. Moreover, in those ju-
risdictions that currently permit such coverage, it is available
only at additional cost to attorneys who must purchase a rider to
their basic policy.8 7 Attorneys should not, however, be able to
insure against punitive damages that result from acts of actual
malice. Public policy or the "common sense of the entire com-
munity" requires that attorneys be held directly accountable for
the consequences of conduct that results in intended harm.88
IV. CONCLUSION
The professional liability insurance policies held by most at-
torneys are likely to afford some coverage of the torts of mali-
cious prosecution and defamation, provided that it can be estab-
lished that the claim was initiated during a policy's period of
coverage and that the defendant-attorney is a named insured
under the policy. The scope and extent of the coverage provided,
however, is unclear. State bar associations may wish to request
revisions in policy form that will resolve present uncertainties
and expressly include coverage for abuse of process. Although
attorneys who act with actual malice and intent to cause a re-
sulting harm should be denied coverage, a policy's coverage of
conduct tainted only by legal malice should be stated more
clearly. Moreover, because courts may construe present policies
to exclude coverage for abuse of process, despite the similarity of
the tort to malicious prosecution, policies should be revised to
provide express coverage of abuse of process. In those states in
which public policy is not adverse to insuring against punitive
damages resulting from intentional acts yielding unintentional
injuries, attorneys may want to purchase a rider affording such
coverage. As the frequency and success of third-party tort ac-
tions against attorneys continue to increase,89 insurance that
87. The SYII policy rider states: "In consideration of the premium charged and the
mutual covenants contained in the Policy, it is mutually agreed and declared that: The
Punitive Damage Exclusions under the policy is hereby deleted." SYII policy, supra note
42, Punitive Damage Deletion Endorsement E-133. The cost of these riders normally is
approximately twenty percent of the base premium.
88. See Kottmeier, 323 So. 2d at 606. The appeal in Kottmeier was on the issue of
coverage for compensatory damages. Coverage for punitive damages was deemed ex-
cluded at trial. Id.
89. Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability, supra note 78, at 265, 283-86.
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provides more complete coverage for these torts becomes more
necessary.
R. Bentz Kirby
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